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Abstract
The problem of records retention is often viewed as simply deleting records when
they have outlived their purpose. However, in the world of relational databases there
is no standardized notion of a business record and its retention obligations. Unlike
physical documents such as forms and reports, information in databases is organized
such that one item of data may be part of various legal records and consequently
subject to several (and possibly conflicting) retention policies. This thesis proposes
a framework for records retention in relational database systems. It presents a mech-
anism through which users can specify a broad range of protective and destructive
data retention policies for relational records. Compared to näıve solutions for en-
forcing records management policies, our framework is not only significantly more
efficient but it also addresses several unanswered questions about how policies can
be mapped from given legal requirements to actions on relational data. The novelty
in our approach is that we defined a record in a relational database as an arbitrary
logical view, effectively allowing us to reduce several challenges in enforcing data
retention policies to well-studied problems in database theory. We argue that our
expression based approach of tracking records management obligations is not only
easier for records managers to use but also far more space/time efficient compared
to traditional metadata approaches discussed in the literature. The thesis concludes
with a thorough examination of the limitations of the proposed framework and sug-
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Storage of records has always been a fundamental objective of information systems.
However in the past decade managing sensitive information throughout its lifecycle,
from creation to destruction (or archival), has become of significant importance. The
increasing awareness of the impact of technology on privacy has added momentum
to the need to have better enforcement of records retention policies. Organizations
today not only have to comply with regulations, but also have to maintain a balance
between operational record keeping requirements, minimizing liability of storing
private information, and customer privacy preferences.
There is no globally accepted definition of a record and one of the primary ques-
tions addressed in this thesis is to answer what is a record in the context of relational
database systems. The ISO 15489 standard defines a record as “information created,
received, and maintained as evidence and information by an organization or person,
in pursuance of legal obligations or in the transaction of business.” Unfortunately,
like most attempts to define a record, it leaves much to the interpretation of the
records manager. For example, the question of whether an organization’s internal
emails should be treated as business records, cannot be directly answered using this
definition. It is often fundamentally impossible to mechanize the process of classify-
ing a piece of information as a business record and to determine whether storing it
will be beneficial for the business. The tendency in most organizations traditionally
has been to play it safe and to lean towards a “store everything” approach.
This work will not attempt to define the term “record” in the broad context.
Instead the term will be treated in all its generality and then applied to the world
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of relational databases. Without attempting to differentiate terms such as data,
knowledge, information and record, it is recommended that the reader maintain
a simple but consistent definition of a record throughout this thesis. Since the
proposed framework is heavily geared towards records generated using a typical
relational database system, the examples used in the work will be those of trans-
actional records. Examples include a sales report, an invoice, a telephone bill or a
student’s transcripts. Such records typically exist as physical documents, and they
have a visible structure and strong correlation with the underlying relational data.
Examples of non-typical transactional records include, a single number such as the
total number of employees in a business or the number of employees with first name
“James.” Non-traditional records typically become part of other records and are
quite often ignored for policy enforcement, especially when embedded in physical
documents.
Records management as described by ISO 15489 is “the field of management
responsible for the efficient and systematic control of the creation, receipt, main-
tenance, use and disposition of records, including the processes for capturing and
maintaining evidence of and information about business activities and transactions
in the form of records.” In essence the task of a records manager is identifying sources
of information where records are created and then managing them throughout their
lifecycle. Typical duties of a records manager include determining and enforcing
policies on records, such as access control, archiving and destruction.
1.1.1 Records Retention
Recent trends in privacy and data management have led to a retention paradigm
different from the store-everything approach. Most organizations have realized that
there can often be significant costs associated with storage of information. The
protection of customers’ personal and financial information, for example, is a duty
and a potential source of liability for online businesses. As the size of a corporate
record repository grows, so does the cost of an accidental information leak. Fur-
thermore the general increase in privacy awareness is leading modern consumers to
demand that their private information not be retained indefinitely by organizations.
Consequently many businesses have voluntarily enforced limited retention practices
where sensitive records are destroyed when the cost of retaining them outweighs the
benefits.
Equally concerning are the plethora of legal requirements that businesses face
today. Globally, the number of regulatory requirements mandating businesses to
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retain records for minimum periods have increased significantly. For example after
the Enron scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States has mandated that
audit records of businesses be maintained for at least five years [MS02]. Similarly, in
the wake of the Madrid and London bombings, the EU Directive on Data Retention
has explicitly mandated strict record keeping requirements for businesses such as
telecommunications companies and Internet Service Providers [DFK06].
Many businesses today faces the unique challenge of finding the correct balance
between legal compliance, operational record keeping, and satisfying consumer pri-
vacy preferences. Destroying records too early can constitute a criminal offense
and retaining them for too long can become a liability or constitute a violation of
published policy.
1.2 Policy Management
1.2.1 Identification and Classification
There are several fundamental problems in retention policy management that make
records management a difficult task. However, the most critical requirements for
proper records retention are identification and classification of records.
Record identification is the task of determining which information or event needs
to be documented and treated as a significant business record. The legal definition
of a record, or an event leading to information being recognized as a record, is
usually unclear and varies depending on the situation. As an example, consider a
scenario where an employee is notifying his employer regarding a workplace safety
hazard. Such first notices are recognized as critical legal records, and they are often
used for litigation purposes. These records also have legislated minimum retention
periods, regardless of the medium in which they are presented, which largely puts the
burden of records identification and preservation on the corporation. In this case,
the employee has the right to mention workplace safety related issues in an informal
conversation with his supervisor, in a meeting, as a formally written complaint, as
an email, or as part of a report. It is important to recognize that from a purely
legal perspective, in many situations no physical document needs to be created
for a record to be realized. Visible records with structure and purpose such as
reports, invoices and requisition forms are relatively easy to identify. However, if
a typical personal email or a daily status report contains a special notice about
workplace safety, it needs to be treated very differently from other similar types
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of communication. Consequently most businesses train and require employees to
identify issues and to observe the relevant record keeping obligations related to
them, so that the corporate records management policy can function effectively.
Since it is infeasible to design an individual retention policy for every record,
policies are typically specified for types or classes of records. Once a particular record
is identified the next step is to classify it into one of the pre-defined classes to ensure
the correct retention policies are enforced on it. Although the task of classification
is significantly easier when compared to identification, it leads to potential cross-
classification conflicts as we begin to integrate policies originating from different
areas of a business.
1.2.2 Policy Conflicts
Formulating records management policies within a particular department may be
challenging, but integrating records and policies that involve several functional ar-
eas of an organization can be a significantly more complicated task. Various de-
partments can use the same records differently and may specify retention policies
without considering the company-wide implications. A retention conflict is essen-
tially a conflict between two different actions (deletion and protection) required on
a particular record. The primary source of conflicts are varying minimum and max-
imum retention periods among different types of business records. For example, a
typical scenario in businesses is that of the human resource department warrant-
ing that employment details be deleted a fixed time after an employee leaves the
company. An employment record on which such policy is defined may contain a
substantial amount of detailed information such as the social insurance number,
positions held, pay-cheques issued and taxes paid on behalf of the employee. Some
of this information, such as taxation, may have its own independently legislated re-
tention obligations, and other parts, such as salary paid, may be required to persist
indefinitely by other departments of the organization.
The task of a records manager in such situations is to mediate policy require-
ments between various parts of the business. A conflict of policy without a pre-
determined mechanism for resolution represents a situation where user intervention
is required. It is also worth noting that in most business scenarios, due to the com-
plexity of business processes and ill-defined nature of records, it is almost impossible
to enumerate all sources of policy conflicts.
4
1.3 Legal Requirements and Implications
Since there are no clear cut definitions of records over disparate sources of data,
the ability to specify and enforce retention policies without ambiguity is severely
diminished. Typically most legal requirements have to be interpreted by records
managers and applied to each situation independently of other constraints. An
interesting example of a vague definition, taken from the United States Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA 2002), is that of “uniquely iden-
tifiable information.” HIPAA mandates that any exchange of health related data of
patients among organizations for non-medical purposes (such as research and sta-
tistical analysis) must adhere to principles of privacy and not disclose information
that can lead to the unique identification of a patient. Unfortunately the question
of which pieces of information can lead to unique identification of an individual is
not addressed in the law. As pointed out by Sweeney in her work on k-anonymity
[Swe02], the concepts of candidate and primary keys are largely inapplicable in this
case. She noticed that the 3-tuple {ZIP, gender, date of birth}, although strictly
not a candidate key, can easily and uniquely identify 87% of Americans. Similarly
for different combinations of given information, such as ethnicities, age ranges and
street addresses, it may be possible to identify many individuals precisely. The law
however, puts the burden of defining and assessing which information (combination
of tuples) can lead to unique identification of every individual on the record keeper.
Needless to say that implementing mechanisms to comply with such regulations is
an extremely challenging task.
Some industries that are legally mandated to demonstrate effective retention
policies in their record keeping practices include health-care, financial manage-
ment (banks, credit issuing organizations and auditing/accounting firms), insur-
ance, telecommunication and Internet services providers. These retention laws can
be independently specified at the federal level, at the level of individual states and
provinces and possibly (but rarely) at the level of local governing bodies. It is inter-
esting to note that records can be subject to a variety of temporal and non-temporal
conditions. A typical example in health care is that of the Florida Administrative
Code for medical facilities with a pediatric program [ML03]: if a minor is treated in
a medical facility that is subject to this code, then all medical records (diagnostic
reports and treatments given) must be maintained until three years after the pa-
tient reaches the age of majority as specified in the state law. In 2002, with the
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a much broader umbrella of record keep-
ing requirements were put on all public companies in the United States. These
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requirements mostly dealt with establishing mandatory minimum retention periods
for corporate financial (primarily auditing related) records. The granularity of data
on which retention periods are defined is still very vague and can be interpreted to
go as far as mandating minimum retention periods for invoices, individual emails,
and even voice-mail messages that may be significantly related to the financial oper-
ations of an organization. The rule of thumb for Sarbanes-Oxley compliance is that
any information that is significant for financial auditing must be preserved (retained
and protected from being tampered) for at least 7 years. Organizations facing these
ambiguously defined record keeping requirements can not only be asked to present
their “records” for examination but can also be faced with fines if they fail to satisfy
an auditor of records that they have adequately managed their corporate records.
In many record keeping situations, such as law enforcement, no single piece of
data can ever be truly deleted. Blanchette and Johnson point out in their exami-
nation of modern data retention practices [BJ98] that in situations such as juvenile
criminal records, data retention can be a curse for many individuals throughout
their life. Even though crimes can be pardoned, they are rarely deleted from crim-
inal records: instead they are appended with a pardon-related entry. Her critical
review of data retention practices in several industries leads to the conclusion that
social-forgetfulness (which arguably may be beneficial for our society) is generally
not supported by our rigid record keeping infrastructure.
From a different perspective data retention requirements, where not mandated
legally, can be an operational business requirement. An interesting case is that of
contractors of the Department of Defense in the United States (DoD). The DoD
mandates that all electronic communications (especially emails) between DoD em-
ployees and any contractors must not be retained by the contractor for more than
three years. Each organization that wishes to do business with the DoD must sub-
mit to a retention audit and, apart from hundreds of other security related require-
ments, must also demonstrate that electronic communications are properly deleted
according to a transparent schedule. Recently other business have also begun im-
plementing similar operational requirements. VISA, for example, is attempting to
extract guarantees from its online credit card processing subsidiaries that warrant
deletion of customers’ data after a fixed and publicly available time after a credit
card transaction is completed.
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1.4 State of the Art in Records Retention
Although records management is a very mature field in itself, software solutions
for effective management of business records have only emerged in the last two
decades. In the realm of software, the term for managing business records that
is widely recognized is Enterprise Content Management. Enterprise Content Man-
agement (ECM) can best be described as the use of computerized techniques for
effective management of content generated through the activities of a business. The
word ‘content’ is specifically used to encompass all forms of digital and non-digital
information. ECM aims to simplify the overall task of creating, distributing and
maintaining business related content, such as documents, videos, spreadsheets, pre-
sentations. Most ECM systems also attempt to aid in inter-team communications
(groupware) and provide workflow management facilities. The largest players in the
ECM market are OpenText with their LiveLink suite of products followed by EMC
and IBM [Eid06].
The umbrella of content which current ECM solutions manage has been sig-
nificantly extended to include emails, instant messages and even mobile messages
between employees. Among the features offered in records management suites, the
focus has been on collaboration (versioning and distribution), work flow manage-
ment, and access control. Since the broader need to demonstrate records retention
compliance has emerged only recently, retention is a relatively new feature in soft-
ware based ECM systems. The functionality for retention offered in such systems
is usually geared towards proper classification of records and then destroying them
according to a certain fixed schedule.
The expressiveness of retention policies in most ECM systems is sufficient for
a broad range of user requirements. Content is typically managed (classified and
retained) using metadata. For example, in the LiveLink eDOCS Email Management
System, company-wide emails can be automatically classified based on message
metadata such as date received, sender address and receiver address. Advanced
features such as classification based on regular expression matches within the email
body and attachments are also available, and classification on-demand can also be
performed. Retention rules, for example, deleting emails five years after creation,
can be specified for classes of similar emails. ECM systems are generally expected
to track client and server copies of records (emails in this case) and ensure that any
retention conflict arising through cross-classification is brought to the attention of
the administrator.
7
Figure 1.1: The broader picture in records management
1.5 Problem Statement
In this thesis we focus on several core problems of retention policy management for
records in relational databases including identification, classification, enforcement,
conflict detection and resolution. Our work is motivated by the fact that ECM
systems do not consider databases as content and are therefore unable to support
the enforcement of retention policies at the granularity of rows and attributes. We
also note that timely destruction of documents (derived through relational data)
does not necessarily imply that the information contained within those documents
has been lost. Figure 1.1 depicts this disconnect between physical records and
relational databases. It is obvious that shredding the relevant printed documents
and deleting electronic versions of those documents is not sufficient if they can simply
be recreated using the underlying data. All retention policies and obligations that
are enforced on the paper or electronic versions of these documents must also be
enforced in some way on the data which led to the creation of such records.
Furthermore, when we consider relational systems, there may be many docu-
ments or records that are never materialized. Reports involving relational data may
be dynamically created and viewed by users, but never printed or persisted as files.
However, depending on the legal circumstances, these virtual records may be subject
to the same obligations as physical records.
There has not been any significant work done in the area of records retention
for records encapsulated within relational databases. Since ECM systems view the
database as a single object or file it is unlikely that effective retention policies can
be specified and enforced using such a coarse perspective. It is stipulated that there
are not many organizations that implement, monitor and maintain company wide
relational record retention policies. Needless to say database systems do not have
any native functionality for retention, and it has to be modeled as an elaborate
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set of access control mechanisms (for enforcing minimum retention periods) and
batch programs (for enforcing maximum retention periods). The problem is further
exacerbated by the fact that schema evolution and introduction of new policies can
pose significant overhead costs in manually updating the control mechanisms for
retention.
It is obvious that the traditional ECM approach of simply attaching metadata
to records containing policy requirements for data cannot be translated efficiently
onto the relational world. Having a timestamp which denotes when data needs to be
protected/removed, associated with every row/attribute is simply space inefficient
and will most certainly not scale up for modern high performance database systems.
Furthermore the issue of how these timestamps will be assigned and maintained by
administrators is unclear. This thesis addresses the need for a much more efficient
and systematic way of retaining records in relational database systems than a sim-
ple metadata approach. We re-examine the problem of records retention from a
different perspective and present a new way of looking at records, which makes the
task of record identification and classification in relational systems easy for records
managers. The thesis examines efficient mechanisms for enforcing protective reten-
tion policies, such as those that mandate records be protected from unwarranted
deletions, and also develops a framework for destruction of relational records as they
outlive their retention period. Most importantly a formal layer of reasoning about
records and detecting policy conflicts is presented. It is expected that using the
proposed framework in situations involving complex and evolving database schemas




Records in Relational Database
Systems
2.1 Practical Implications
From a non-technical perspective, database systems simply store data, and it is only
when data is presented in a meaningful fashion that it is considered to be a record.
However, when talking in terms of database concepts and attempting to correlate
the commonly held notion of records with data stored in relations, it is challenging
to derive a definition of a record that can be widely accepted.
As an example of the complexity involved, consider a typical university database
which manages student enrollment and finances. For the university registrar, the
term ‘student record’ will most likely refer to the entire history of courses in which
the student has enrolled. However, it is unlikely that the finance department will
have the same definition of a student record, as they would be more interested in
the various fee payments made by the student. Similarly an instructor might want
to know whether students enrolled in his class have all the relevant pre-requisites,
consequently defining a record as a subset of what the registrar considers as a
record. Going back to the issue of meaningful presentation of data, a single tuple
representing an entity, such as a student, can be meaningful and considered to be
a record. At the same time a single tuple in a many-to-many relation, such as one
relating a student number to a course number indicating the enrollment of a student
in a particular course, may not be meaningful in isolation (if not considered in the
context of a join).
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Figure 2.1: Queries and physical records are both infinite sets with possible over-
lapping information present between them.
There is no simple answer to what is a record in relational systems. Most of us
would typically think of records as tuples or rows in a database table. Unfortunately
from the examples above we can see that this perspective on a record is not only very
limited but also not universally applicable. Any row in a table can be meaningless
unless we associate a context with it. Similarly while one person may consider a
row to be a meaningful record, another might only consider the contents of the
whole table to be meaningful. To mediate such differences in interpretation, we
define a record in the most simple and elegant terms, as data presented such that it
holds meaning in a user’s context. In essence it is the well formed and meaningful
questions (queries) posed to a database system whose results are considered to be
records. Each user may have different questions whose results they consider valuable
records. Since the number of queries that can be posed to a database system is
infinite, it follows that the number of potential records that can be generated using
a database system is also infinite. Of course the result of all queries on a database
system may not be meaningful from a business perspective, but there is no algorithm
to determine which queries produce meaningful records. It is only the users of a
database system who can decide what is a record generating query. Conversely,
there can also be an infinite number of physical records that are not derived from a
database system. Figure 2.1 summarizes this relationship between physical records
and database queries.
The problem of identifying the particular queries and the results that are mean-
ingful enough to be considered a business record leads to an interesting legal dilemma.
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The assertion that the printed (or stored) result of every query can legally consti-
tute a record is rather far-fetched. On the other hand, claiming that databases
store data and not records, as a defense for not complying with legislated records
retention policies, is also not a convincing argument. Our initial research has led
to the conclusion that most organizations consider only documents that are visi-
bly generated from database systems, such as invoices and sales reports as business
records. On the other hand, recent court rulings related to legal and forensic anal-
ysis of computer equipment (as in the case of Enron) have considered every piece of
available data as fair game for prosecutor examination. Interestingly, most OLAP
tools and report creation wizards have the ability to create an overwhelmingly large
number of reports and documents through complex manipulations of data. Whether
businesses should be aware of (or liable for) the wide array of undiscovered potential
records that can be created from their database systems is still unclear in the law.
Unfortunately, our examination recent work related to privacy in database systems
(presented in Section 6.1) has revealed that most experts think of databases as a
collection of rows. However as soon as we go beyond this definition of record and
include the fact that these rows can be combined and manipulated in hundreds of
ways to obtain other interesting records, we run into very complex problems for
data retention purposes.
2.1.1 Proposed Definition
Definition 2.1. A relational record is a logical view specified by a relational expres-
sion over a fixed physical schema.
Informally a relational record is the data presented as the result of an arbitrary
SQL query. Note that unlike physical (static) records, the data presented in the
record can change, but the record definition always stays the same. Also note that
the above definition does not restrict the expressiveness of the language used to
specify individual records in any way. However the advantages of doing so will duly
be pointed out throughout this thesis. As an example consider record definitions to
be restricted to conjunctive queries. Since conjunctive queries are well understood,
we can leverage known results from database theory to help in statically analyzing
different properties of records. The less restrictive the language used to specify
relational records the more difficult all our management tasks will become.
Note that this definition is inherently flexible as it allows us to define a record
as we wish. For example we can still take the basic approach to records being
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Figure 2.2: A simplified overview of Emmerson’s Records Lifecycle [Emm89, UB04]
rows and attributes, and at the same time add as much complexity in operations
on relational data as we wish for defining a record. Finally, it is important to
emphasize the equivalence of relational records and logical views over the physical
schema. Since it is only the presentation of data that makes a record, views are the
ideal abstraction for data manipulated in a meaningful fashion (We discuss this point
further in the light of some real world examples in Section 2.3). From this point
onwards we will use the terms relational record, view and query interchangeably, as
they are equivalent for our purposes.
2.2 Temporal Records
Records have a lifecycle consisting of at least three stages, namely creation, activity
and destruction (or archival). For a broad ranging discussion of various proposed
models of records lifecycle the reader is directed to [YC00]. This thesis asserts that,
barring certain exceptions, such as temporary data which is created and deleted
within the same transaction, records in relational databases have a similar lifecycle
(see Figure 2.2). Unfortunately, such lifecycle models cannot explicitly specify the
conditions under which a record moves between individual stages nor specify stages
where a record may be protected (or subject to destruction). Depending on the
sensitivity of the data, some records may achieve protective status from the moment
they are created, whereas others may have long retention periods which may require
them to be deleted after they have been archived into warehouses1. Our survey
of a wide array of records retention requirements legally mandated on businesses
(Sarbanes-Oxley, HIPAA etc) leads to the conclusion that a majority of these policies
are defined with time-driven conditions.
Consequently, a temporal function needs to be introduced in the language used
to express records, through which users can represent the current time in record
1This problem is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
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definitions and policies. This temporal function will be denoted as NOW. Using
NOW, users can define records as a function of time, such as “invoices created more
than six years ago.” Although the use of NOW adds significant expressive power
to the record definition language, there are certain complications and challenges
with the use of this temporal construct. Temporally defined records are not easy
to understand due to the fluid nature of time. A record that may be empty at
one instance of time may contain information at the next. The opposite, of course,
can also happen. Even though a database may not have changed state in any way,
simply the passage of time may trigger changes in a record. Note that we are
not proposing to extend the relational model to support temporal data. Instead
NOW will only be used to define records and policies over traditional relational
schemas and stored data such as timestamps/date-time attributes. If the existing
data model (schema) cannot support the storage of temporal information and is
unable to answer temporal queries then we will not be able to support retention
on such records. This limitation is a direct consequence of the fact that only data
which is stored physically can be retained and that the physical design must be able
to accommodate data retention requirements.
2.3 Physical Documents as Sets of Views
A set of relational records can be considered a direct mapping of a traditional record
onto a database schema. When considering traditional records such as invoices and
sales reports in their physical form, it can be observed that many of these records
have a structure, or a template, that can be directly translated onto the relational
world. For example, invoices are typically structured as having uniquely identifi-
able information followed by the details of individual line items concluded with a
summary of the invoice. Similarly, in the case of phone bills, customer information
is typically followed by a list of entries signifying the calls placed/received. From
a database programmer’s perspective the significant difference between two phone
bills is not the information contained in those records, but rather the parameters,
such as customer ID and billing period, that are used to generate those records.
Consider a simplified schema for a phone company defined, where it is assumed
that a customer may have more than one phone number with the company:
Customer (Customer ID, Street Address, City, ... )
Phones (Customer ID, Phone Number )
Calls (Call ID, Origin, Destination, Duration, DateTime, ... )
15
In this schema the physical phone bill (or the data that goes therein) for the number
519-123-4567 for the month of July 2007, can be specified as a combination of two
relational expressions:
Example 2.1
Bill5191234567 = {R1, R2}
where R1 = SELECT * FROM Customer, Phones
WHERE Phone Number = ‘5191234567’
AND Customer.Customer ID = Phones.Customer ID
and R2 = SELECT * FROM Calls
WHERE Origin = ‘5191234567’
AND DateTime >= ‘July 01, 2007’ AND DateTime <= ‘July 31, 2007’
or alternatively as a single expression:
Example 2.2
Bill5191234567 = {R1}
where R1 = SELECT * FROM Customer, Phones, Calls
WHERE Phone Number = ‘5191234567’
AND DateTime >= ‘July 01, 2007’ AND DateTime <= ‘July 31, 2007’
AND Origin = Phone Number
AND Customer.Customer ID = Phones.Customer ID
Note that both of the above definitions for a phone bill capture and identify the
same data using conjunctive queries, but they are expressed differently. A document
(physical record) can have the result of several queries embedded in it, therefore a
document can be described as a collection of relational records. It can also be argued
that since the first definition clearly separates entities (customer and calls placed)
into different relational records, it mirrors a physical record more accurately than
the second definition. There are several advantages of mapping physical documents
into multiple relational records which are their visible equivalents in the physical
world. These are discussed in Section 5.2.
Going further with our examples of relational records, we can also capture multi-
ple physical records (or a whole category of physical records) together by eliminating
parameters from record definitions. The following relational record which is very
similar to the previous one, captures the information contained in all telephone bills




where R1 = SELECT * FROM Customer, Phones, Calls
WHERE Origin = Phone Number
AND DateTime >= ‘July 01, 2007’ AND DateTime <= ‘July 31, 2007’
AND Customer.Customer ID = Phones.Customer ID
Although it is unlikely that there will ever be a single physical document cap-
turing the data contained in all telephone bills for the month of July 2007, records
managers still should be able to declaratively define such records for the purposes
of retention policy enforcement. Finally, the following is an example of a temporal
record definition, which captures all the phones bills issued between three and six
years ago. This record is of course non-traditional in nature (a continuously sliding
window) and does not have a physical equivalent.
Example 2.4
BillsV eryOld = {R1}
where R1 = SELECT * FROM Customer, Phones, Calls
WHERE Origin = Phone Number
AND Years (NOW - DateTime) <= 6
AND Years (NOW - DateTime) >= 3
AND Customer.Customer ID = Phones.Customer ID
An important observation is that record definitions are not limited in any way.
The complexity of the record is only limited by the expressions used to specify the
record. For example, if the marketing department of the phone company wants a
report listing customers that have placed at least two calls that lasted for more than
60 minutes, from Toronto to London in a one month period, they are free to do so
using their choice of declarative query language. Similarly, if government legislation
requires phone companies to retain records of international calls placed to certain
countries for at least 10 years, the particular records that they require can be defined
using this mechanism.
Note that the examples of records given above are all in SQL syntax. The reason
for choosing such presentation is only simplicity and because it makes the above
examples easy to understand for the typical records manager. Any other language
capable of querying a relational database, such as datalog or relational algebra,
would also suffice for defining records as views. However, it is very likely that the
eventual goal of any records retention system for relational databases would be to
define and implement policies over records expressed using the full expressiveness
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of SQL. Consequently discussing examples in the light of actual SQL queries is a
suitable approach.
Defining a record gives us a handle on the data that we want to protect or destroy
when the correct conditions are met. Consequently, we have chosen a very broad
and flexible definition of a relational record, which can allow records managers to
capture all possible records that can be generated through a database system. This
definition is in stark contrast to the traditional row-based approach of looking at
records and is far more expressive in the type of records it allows us to express for
policy enforcement. Note that, even within the small schema used as an example,
countless critical records that may have complex retention obligations on them can
be easily generated. With more complex schemas such as those in large corporate
databases, emergence of an unmanageable web of interrelated and derived records is
a certainty. Simple questions of whether information contained in a particular record
can be deleted without damaging other records or compromising the integrity of the
database need to be addressed. More importantly, what does it mean to delete
a record and how can users specify the conditions necessary for proper retention
and deletion of arbitrary relational expressions? The next two chapters define the






The foremost obligation in the lifecycle of records is that of guaranteeing minimum
retention. In a typical record’s lifecycle, after creation and subject to certain con-
ditions being met, it may be necessary to preserve it until some other pre-defined
conditions are met. In most business situations, determining whether a record
should be protected involves checking simple temporal conditions defined on the
record (see Figure 3.1 for an overview).
As in the case with physical records, there are several levels of protection that
need to be offered to relational records (previously defined as logical views). For
example, protecting a physical sales invoice on which tax has been collected for the
relevant period may imply that the business has to ensure that:
• The invoice is not destroyed (deletion).
• The invoice is not modified (update).
• No new details are added to the invoice or no pre-dated invoices are created
(insertion).
Additionally, there need to be mechanisms through which users are able to spec-
ify the period of time in which a record is to be protected and the conditions under
which the record should be deleted. This chapter deals with the problem of specify-
ing protective retention policies and presents an outline of how such functionality can
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Figure 3.1: The retention timeline of a typical record. Note that not all data inserted
in a database may lead to the creation of logical records as defined by the users.
Furthermore not all records may have mandatory protection periods and retention
limits.
be implemented in a typical off-the-shelf relational database management system.
Our framework adopts an approach for protective policy specification that allows
multiple retention policies to be specified for each record. Consequently users are
first required to define meaningful records and then instantiate protective retention
policies on them.
3.2 Protective Policy Specification
Before discussing how users are able to specify individual protective retention poli-
cies, the notions of retention conditions and protection levels need to be introduced.
We remind the reader that individual records should now be considered to be user
defined views over the physical schema.
Definition 3.1. A retention condition is an optional boolean formula applied to
every tuple of a record for the purposes of policy enforcement.
In the context of a protective retention policy, if the retention condition holds
for a tuple in the view specified by the record definition, then that tuple should be
protected as per policy specifications. If a retention condition is not specified then it
is considered to be always true. Each protective policy may only have one retention
condition associated with it. The purpose of a retention condition is essentially
to separate the critical tuples that warrant protection in the view specified by the
record. A retention condition may be temporal through the use of the variable
NOW, which was introduced earlier. Therefore temporal retention conditions can
be used to specify minimum retention periods in the context of protective retention
policies.
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Protective requirements for relational records are captured using two distinct
protection levels, namely update protection and append protection.
Definition 3.2. A relational record under update protection is one in which any
modification to the database is rejected if it leads to a modification (or a deletion)
of a tuple in the record for which the retention condition holds true.
Intuitively a view being update-protected contains some tuples that can not
be updated or deleted. These tuples are exactly those for which the retention
condition holds true. However for tuples where the retention condition is false, all
modifications to the base data that lead to the modifications of such tuples are legal.
Definition 3.3. A relational record under append protection is one in which any
modification to the database is rejected if it leads to a new tuple becoming part of
the record where the retention condition on that new tuple would be true.
Intuitively a record which is append-protected does not allow the record to in-
crease in size subject to the retention condition. To summarize, update protection
disallows modifications (deletions and updates) of protected tuples in the record,
whereas append protection disallows new tuples from becoming part of the record.
When combined together, these two levels of protection capture all functional re-
quirements of protecting records as discussed in Section 3.1.
3.3 Syntax and Examples
Let us now examine a simplified scenario that will illustrate the notion of temporal
records and policies and demonstrate how both levels of record protection can be
used to accomplish various retention requirements. The following two relations will
be used to depict the schema of a typical invoicing system:
Invoice (INV ID, Date, Approved, Paid, ... )
InvoiceLineItem (ILI ID, INV ID, Description, Amount, Tax, ... )
Let us also define two different records as follows:
Example 3.1
OldUnpaidInvoices = {R1}
where R1 = SELECT INV ID, ILI ID, Description, Amount, Tax
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FROM Invoice, InvoiceLineItem
WHERE Years (NOW - DateTime) > 5
AND Paid = ‘False’
AND Invoice.Inv ID = InvoiceLineItem.Inv ID
Example 3.2
Invoices2006 = {R2}
where R2 = SELECT *
FROM Invoice, InvoiceLineItem
WHERE Date < ‘Jan 01, 2007’
AND Date >= ‘Jan 01, 2006’
AND Invoice.Inv ID = InvoiceLineItem.Inv ID
We begin by introducing a formal syntax for defining record protection policies.
As stated earlier, a protective retention policy must be specified on pre-defined
records. Note that the proposed syntax offers two forms of update protection, one
where all columns of a record are protected, and the other where only selected
columns are protected against updates.
Syntax 3.1
DEFINE <Policy Name> AS
PROTECT<Record Name>
FROM <UPDATE <column list> | APPEND | ANYCHANGE>
WHILE <retention condition>
3.3.1 Protection Levels
To differentiate between UPDATE and APPEND protection consider the follow-
ing two protective retention constraints declared on the record type Invoices2006
defined above:
Example 3.3
DEFINE Constraint A AS
PROTECTInvoices 2006
FROM UPDATE *
WHILE Paid = ‘True’
Example 3.4




Constraint A simply specifies that all invoices marked paid along with all their
line items should not be updatable (or deletable). As far as the underlying data is
concerned, Constraint A will effectively abort all transactions that lead to modifi-
cations of any tuple in the Invoices2006 view if the tuple had the paid attribute set
to true.
While Constraint A prevents updating of tuples that are protected, it does allow
new tuples to become part of the record. Without Constraint B users are free
to create invoices for the year 2006 and mark them as paid today, giving them
immediate protective status. Consequently append protection as demonstrated in
constraint B is used to manage the conditions under which a new tuple can be
inserted into the record. The ANYCHANGE protection level is simply a simpler
way of enforcing UPDATE * and APPEND at the same time. Using variations of
update and append level protective constraints with a variety of temporal retention
conditions, many flexible policies can be implemented on pre-defined records.
3.3.2 Temporal Records and Protection Levels
Although database systems have the ability to abort statements and transactions
that attempt to modify protected views, it is impossible to abort the passage of
time. Consequently, the definition of append level protection must be clarified to
state that it will only protect records against user initiated modifications of the
underlying data.
As an example consider the temporal record OldUnpaidInvoices (Example 3.1)
defined above and the following append level protective constraint:
Example 3.5
DEFINE Constraint X AS
PROTECTOldUnpaidInvoices
FROM APPEND
The retention condition in Constraint X (none present) is always true which
may mislead us to believe that any increase in the size of the record should be
rejected. However as invoices become older than five years and remain unpaid, they
will automatically become part of the record and thus violate this constraint. Since
we are unable to stop temporal violations of retention policies, we take this as valid
behavior.
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3.4 Framework for Implementation
3.4.1 Non-Temporal views
We note that protective retention policies on views simply disallow updates and
insertions and resemble access control features on views. Implementation of such
features is not a significant challenge and there are several approaches that can
be taken including relying on access control (on base relations) or piggy backing
protective retention policies over integrity constraints. However, the overall task of
monitoring views and critical rows is equivalent to that of efficient view maintenance.
We now discuss the details of how the problem of implementing protective re-
tention constraints can be reduced to that of view maintenance. In essence we use
the previously established definitions of a retention condition and record to define a
protected view. This view, which is formed by adding the retention condition into
the record definition, will be denoted as a critical view.
Definition 3.4. For a record specified by expression Q and a retention condition
on Q specified by C(Ret), the critical view for the associated policy is denoted as Vc
and specified by σC(Ret)(Q).
In short, implementing update protection policies can be reduced to monitoring
a critical view and rejecting all updates to the database that cause updates in the
critical view. Similarly, append protection can be implemented by monitoring the
relevant critical view and disallowing all updates to the database that add a new
tuple to the critical view. The problem of detecting whether a particular update
will impact a view has been well studied in the context of relevant and irrelevant
updates to views.
Definition 3.5 (Blakely et al.[BCL89]). For a given database D, a view definition
V and an update U which takes D from instance d to instance d ′, U is considered
to be irrelevant to V if V(d) = V(d ′) for all instances d.
If an update cannot impact a view regardless of the database state then it is
considered irrelevant. Blakeley et al. also define irrelevant insertions and irrelevant
deletions with a similar meaning to that of update. Detecting irrelevant updates is
fundamental for the efficient maintenance of a large collection of materialized views.
24
In the special case where the view definition language is restricted to conjunctive
queries we can efficiently detect irrelevant updates [BCL89, BLT86]. Furthermore,
it was shown that in the absence of the negation operator O(n3) runtime in the
number of predicates is possible for detecting irrelevant updates of conjunctive views.
Essentially for any arbitrary conjunctive view specified as σC(Y )(R1×R2× ...×Rn)
and a tuple t :< a1, a2, ...ap > in Ri where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, whether that t plays a role in
the view can be determined by substituting t in C(Y ) for the relevant predicates and
solving the satisfiability problem. If the expression is unsatisfiable, we are certain
that t is irrelevant to the view.
This result is of extreme importance in our case. Firstly we argue that con-
junctive queries are ‘good enough’ to describe a large number of business records.
Most physical documents are designed to be straightforward, consequently the lan-
guage used to describe them does not require significant expressiveness. We have
examined several examples of physical documents such as sales reports, invoices,
telephone bills, and all can be specified with relative ease using a combination of
conjunctive queries. Furthermore, we point out that this result is not weak in any
way. As noted by Cohen [Coh06], this result can be trivially extended to aggregates
and a broad class of user defined functions. The observation is that for relevancy,
a view V with an aggregated attribute is essentially equivalent to a view V ′ with
the same attribute without aggregation. If an update is irrelevant to V ′ it is also
irrelevant to V . New insertions in V ′ that are ‘neutral’ in the context of aggregation
(for example 0 has no affect for summation) are also irrelevant for V . Note that
similar arguments could be made for many operations performed on data specified
through the use of conjunctive queries.
While detecting irrelevant updates can significantly improve the performance of
concurrently maintaining a large number of views, we gain nothing if we learn that a
particular update is relevant. A relevant update has the potential to affect a critical
view, but the actual database state needs to be examined to conclude whether the
view will actually require changes. From an implementation perspective, protecting
tuples that satisfy the criteria of being in a critical view does not require full ma-
terialization of the critical view. The cost of checking individual tuples which are
being updated against all critical relevant view definitions is significant, but we will
shortly demonstrate that in practical scenarios it will rarely be incurred.
To summarize, conditionally protecting non-temporal records can be done through
direct monitoring of the critical views that they specify. This functionality is already
present in most off-the-shelf systems and can also be modeled using mechanisms such
as access control or integrity constraints. For conjunctive queries, which are suffi-
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ciently expressive for our scenario, many worst case costs can be easily avoided by
leveraging techniques presented in the literature for incremental view maintenance.
3.4.2 Temporal Views
In the context of data retention we do not require temporal views in their full gen-
erality since we do not model database histories. Instead we and are only interested
in implementing and enforcing policies on the current state of the database. Conse-
quently the class of temporal views that we need to support is very limited. In our
model temporal views only result from the use of the temporal function NOW in
the selection predicate of queries. Such views can also be considered to be sliding
windows with respect to the system clock. The key issue with such views is that
they may require maintenance at every clock tick. In other words they may need
to be refreshed before every query can be processed, even if that query does not
affect the state of the database. The notion of detecting relevant updates in this
case needs to consider the passage of time as well as modifications to base data.
Bækgaard and Mark [BM95] performed a comprehensive analysis of such views.
Their work relied on the fact that since NOW is a monotonically increasing function,
we can pre-determine which tuples will eventually become part of a temporal view
and similarly pinpoint which tuples will no longer be part of the view as time pro-
gresses. By keeping an ordered list of such tuples in a view denoted as a “superview”,
which itself is maintained incrementally, we can greatly reduce the need to recom-
pute temporal views from scratch. This idea is a special case of deferred/scheduled
maintenance of views where we are able to prepare in advance for the actual main-
tenance. Analysis shows that the efficiency of this technique directly depends on
the additional space available for superviews [BM95]. If a superview cannot hold all
tuples that will eventually become part of the primary view, then additional costs
may arise to maintain the superview. For example, consider a view listing all flights
that have departed from a particular airport in the last 24 hours. If the future
superview is limited in space such that it can only accommodate flights departing
from the airport in the next three days, we need to recompute the superview itself
within the three day period so that it too can remain consistent to serve the primary
view. However if a superview is “large enough”, efficiency is not a major concern as
the window to recompute it will be large, providing an adequate safety margin for
the re-computation of the superview.
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3.4.3 Expected Performance
Although we have not implemented and tested a protective retention framework for
records, we envision that the performance penalty incurred by such a system will
be minimal. There are several reasons for this claim, and we conclude this chapter
by presenting a brief summary of our findings that support our hypothesis.
In the context of non-temporal views, it is generally accepted that as the com-
plexity of the view (expressiveness of the associated language) increases, so does
the cost of maintaining it. Over the past two decades significant progress has been
made in reducing overheads associated with view maintenance. We believe that the
majority of transactional business documents can be described as a collection of
queries expressed in a limited query language and that such queries will be feasible
to monitor as views. Our examination of physical business records on which legal re-
tention obligations are specified has concluded that, it is very unlikely that features
such as multiple levels of nesting and recursion will be required to describe such
documents. Furthermore it is also anticipated that typical databases will already
be maintaining materialized copies of views that are actively used to generate busi-
ness records. Therefore piggy-backing on existing infrastructure for views should
not significantly impact the monitoring of non-temporal views.
Although dealing with temporality may seem like a daunting challenge, in the
realm of legal retention policies that is simply not the case. There are many issues
with regard to time and physical business records that make management of tem-
poral records much easier than the overall problem of temporal view maintenance.
Firstly we note that retention policies are usually specified on the order of days
and often months. For example, an invoice created precisely on July 22nd 2006
at 14:12:32.122 is typically treated to be created on July 22nd and the retention
policies specified on the record use the granularity of days if not weeks and months
to specify how long after an event it should be protected. Thus the window of
time available to prepare for record protection and destruction is large and actions
on the record do not require arbitrary temporal precision. In light of the previous
discussion of temporal views (and superviews) this implies that maintenance of the
relevant critical temporal views can be done lazily and at times when the database
system is under low load conditions.
Secondly, in the context of views, we had noted that relevant updates had the
potential to impact multiple views and that in the worst case we may need to check
the contents of each view and the underlying relations to check for policy violations.
However we can use temporal properties of business records to our benefit and
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Figure 3.2: The number of modifications to a record typically declines with the
passage of time. The majority of the updates happen on active and newly created
information. It is also unlikely that there will be a large number of attempts to
modify protected records.
almost completely eliminate this problem. In many business scenarios, as records get
older they achieve temporal stability and are less likely to be modified. Intuitively
we do not expect organizations to regularly modify old records such as invoices
issued in prior years (Figure 3.2). Consequently it may be beneficial to identify
individual tuples in relations that are current and have no retention obligations on
them (complement of tuples participating in the critical view), and then check if
the update operations impact any non-active tuple.
Finally we note that other heuristics for efficient monitoring of temporal views
can also be developed using the above mentioned temporal stability property of
records. One important property of physical business records is that they are typ-
ically referenced monotonically with respect to time. For example, if Invoice #500
was created on Jan 01, 2006 and Invoice #1355 was created on Dec 31, 2006 it
is very likely that the entire range of invoices numbered between these two will
also have been created in the year 2006. In such situations simple maintenance of
pointers provides us with virtual indexes for very efficient checking of temporal con-
ditions. However mechanisms for automatic inference of such correlations must be
implemented or users should be able to specify them, such that the implementation
framework is able to benefit from this knowledge about records.
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Chapter 4
Timely Destruction of Relational
Records
In this chapter we take a closer look at how individual business records modeled as
sets of relational records can be removed from a database system when they have
persisted beyond their specified maximum retention period. Our primary goal is to
formalize the notion of deletion for arbitrary relational expressions and examine im-
plications of our definition of deletion in the light of typical retention requirements.
The natural equivalent of destroying a physical record in the relational space is
that of deleting data which led to the creation of the particular record. However
because of several properties of relational databases such as functional dependencies
and other integrity constraints, data in arbitrarily defined views cannot simply be
deleted. We begin by proposing semantics of how users can specify record deletion
policies and the features that should be available to them in any view based record
retention system. We then examine restrictions that must be placed on record
removal policies and demonstrate how they can be efficiently checked statically
(and dynamically where necessary) to determine if they violate database integrity
constraints. Finally we conclude this chapter by discussing how aspects of record and
database design can significantly affect the scope of enforceable retention policies.
4.1 Requirements
The motivation for destruction policies comes from organizations wishing to absolve
themselves of the liability associated with records derivable from its data. There are
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two natural ways to “destroy records”: users can either delete all data comprising the
record or modify certain parts of it such that it becomes safe to preserve indefinitely.
Selective modification of records is often done to anonymize private and personal
records such as hospital records. Anonymity ensures that data retains its business
value, in terms of statistics, and at the same time poses no storage liability. In a
view based organization of data this implies that users should be able to specify
when tuples need to be deleted or, when and how certain attributes need to be
modified. To do this we reuse the notion of a retention condition to specify a logical
condition which when satisfied by a tuple, implies that it should be removed from
the view or appropriately modified. Note that we still rely on the notion of critical
views but they are now treated in a new way. The new objective is to ensure that
critical views for destructive policies are always empty. As tuples in a record become
part of the critical view, they begin to satisfy the destruction condition and should
be disposed immediately.
A significant limitation of our proposed approach to records removal is that for
complex views involving multiple relations, the meaning of deletion or modifica-
tion (update) must be well defined for policy enforcement purposes. But before
we discuss updates on views in the light of business records, we must separate the
objectives of monitoring and enforcement. It is important to note that in many
situations organizations may only be interested in continuous monitoring of records
for policy violations. Once a policy violation is detected, the system administrator
may be notified to resolve the issue. The remedial actions such as deletion of critical
data in such situations can be performed on a case by case basis, by the adminis-
trator. However, an ad-hoc management of retention violations is only feasible if
the number of violations occurring is small and there exist good business work-flow
processes. We also mentioned earlier that there is often significant flexibility in
the window of time available to delete critical data. Organizations that adopt the
ad-hoc approach to dealing with records retention policies must also have adequate
time for administrator action, or they must design policies in a pre-emptive fashion.
For example, if a legal retention limit for a record is one year, organizations going
with such a strategy could be expected to enforce a retention policy that is stricter
and informs administrators regarding imminent policy violations after 11 months.
Ad-hoc enforcement of retention policies is trivially accomplished by coupling user
alerting mechanisms, such as triggers, with the monitoring of critical views. The
difficulty lies in ensuring that meaningful human intervention actually takes place
and compliance is achieved. Consequently we will focus on automated enforcement
and the complications associated with balancing flexibility in actions that can be
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performed to destroy records and the compliance guarantees that can be offered.
The most flexibility in automated enforcement can be offered if on every policy
violation a user specified program (such as a stored procedure) is executed. This
user programmed procedure could be arbitrarily complex, may examine any part of
the database, and then perform any appropriate actions (updates) to deal with the
violation. A more restrictive approach is that of only allowing modifications to the
view through the record definition itself. Such modifications may include setting
individual attributes in the critical view to null or deleting tuples in specific base
relations. Although it may seem illogical to reduce flexibility in actions that can be
performed on records on policy violations, we will shortly demonstrate that doing
so can have significant advantages. Restricting modifications through views leads to
several questions such as what kind of views can be supported and how updates can
be specified or inferred. There has been significant work done on detecting ambiguity
in updates for views [BS81], automatically inferring correct updates [Kel85], and
helping users visually map updates on views to base data [Kel86]. We argue that the
framework used for updating views is orthogonal to our problem of enforcement. As
long as the specified enforcement actions are not ambiguous for the record definition,
we can fully enforce all actions that the records manager specifies. We believe that
any records management system on views must be flexible and be able to provide
conclusive guarantees regarding enforcement. Consequently we support both these
paradigms in our framework. Users should be able to write special procedures for
handling non-empty critical views or be able to directly make modifications to the
view (if possible). Before we discuss the benefits of both approaches we present
what we envision as a simple syntax for defining destruction policies. Note that in
the syntax given below, records managers have the ability to specify actions such as
deletion from specific base relations and simple overwriting of data in the view, in
addition to the execution of their own custom built procedure:
Syntax 4.1
DEFINE <Policy Name> ON <Record Name>
DO DELETE FROM <relation> |
SET <assignment list> |
EXEC PROCEDURE <proc name>
WHEN <retention condition>
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4.2 Flexibility and Proof of Compliance
One general benefit of records retention policies is that businesses can use them as
defense in civil litigation scenarios [MS02]. However to satisfy courts and govern-
ment agencies that the relevant data has been destroyed, two independent conditions
need to be met. Firstly, outdated data should physically not exist within the orga-
nizational database, for if it is found in an audit, we have failed to abide by given
requirements. More importantly with the introduction of legislation such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, businesses need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there
exist policy mechanisms, manual or automated, within the organization by which
the relevant data must have been destroyed. The combination of compliance and
providing proof of compliance has been one of the strong selling points of mod-
ern ECM systems. They allow businesses not only to demonstrate transparently
the non-existence of outdated data but also to offer a proof of it being destroyed
according to a policy.
Such ‘proofs’ of compliance given by businesses typically rely on simple and on
best efforts arguments. For example, consider a scenario where an organization’s
internal emails are part of a subpoena and it only offers the past two years’ emails
as evidence. A proof of compliance in this case could simply be the use of suitable
records management suite such as Microsoft Exchange Server or OpenText’s Email
Management System, with the relevant policy rule of deleting emails older than
two years. Strictly speaking a formal “proof of compliance” can never be given
because of uncertainties such as emails persisting on paper and in disconnected nodes
(more on these issues in Section 6.2.3). However, the audited use of ECM systems
offers a certain level of confidence and a potential guarantee to external observers.
The value of such proofs can be witnessed from the fact that many ECM systems,
especially for email management, are now being branded as capable of offering
“Department of Defense (DoD) compliance” and “Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) compliance.” Government agencies such as the United States DoD naturally
do not want their records to be floating around in their sub-contractors’ computer
systems. In these cases, an organization (or a contractor) communicating with the
Department of Defense through email, must demonstrate compliance through the
use of retention-aware email management systems. Thus it becomes obvious why
ECM vendors have jumped on the opportunity to capitalize on this requirement of
a meta proof of compliance.
We believe that any data retention framework for relational databases systems
must also be able to provide a proof of compliance. As awareness of data retention
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encompasses relational systems, providing proofs of deletion (or similar actions such
as overwriting with nulls) of data will become a necessity. However, these proofs
must be better than best-effort (reasons discussed in Section 5.2), and if offered
must formally hold in all instances of the database. We argue that if a proof of
compliance is required, retention policies and actions must be treated as first class
citizens similar to integrity constraints. Analogous to the fact that no user (not
even the administrator) is able to violate fundamental rules such as primary key
and foreign key constraints, no user should be able to bypass and violate retention
policies. Assuming that retention policies are correctly formed, required actions
are timely executed without any possible chance of exception, and the closed world
assumption holds for the database, then a proof of compliance is easily derivable.
Note that we can still entertain the notion of flexibility in policy enforcement, but
it cannot be interchanged with the correctness of a proof of compliance. For example,
if a user programmed stored procedure is proven (through formal verification) to
delete all outdated records in all possible instances of a database without exception,
and this programmed procedure is executed weekly, then we certainly have enough
evidence to prove that our database is retention compliant up to a weekly basis. We
will refer back to this all-encompassing user programmed procedure to examine what
are its fundamental requirements if it is to provide a formal proof of compliance.
This procedure/oracle is the only benchmark for existing solutions and is the closest
mechanism that can be compared to our proposed framework
Sadly, verification of user programmed procedure containing arbitrarily defined
policy rules is non-trivial and is essentially equivalent to the problem of verification
of arbitrary C programs. Depending on the data structures used by this procedure
and its complexity, the solution may simply be infeasible. Furthermore creating
and maintaining such procedure(s) in itself is a daunting task. Fortunately, by
reducing the flexibility in enforcement actions we can make the problem of creating
and reasoning about policy actions much more manageable.
4.3 Correct Enforcement
Let us assume that we are given a procedure (oracle) to delete outdated records when
a policy violation is detected. The first critical requirement for proving correctness
of this procedure is to prove that for all database instances and for all policy viola-
tions, the actions taken as a response by the oracle have a ‘remedial effect.’ More
specifically, whenever a critical view becomes non-empty, the actions taken by the
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oracle must eliminate the newly added tuples from the view. Yet another way to
look at it is that for every policy violation the oracle must be notified only once and
it should always resolve the violation successfully. We formalize these requirements
using two correctness criteria as defined below:
Definition 4.1 (Weak Correctness). A destruction policy P is weakly correct if on
any tuple becoming part of the critical view Vc the actions specified by the policy
denoted by α(R) will ensure that Vc will be empty.
Definition 4.2 (Non-Invasive Policies). A destruction policy P is non-invasive with
respect to another policy P ′ if the actions specified by P denoted as α(R) never af-
fect the critical view of P ′. P is called invasive with respect to P ′ if α(R) has the
potential to change the contents of the critical view of P ′.
Definition 4.3 (Strong Correctness). A destruction policy P is strongly correct if
it is weakly correct and
i) P is non-invasive with respect to all other destruction policies in the database or
ii) P can only delete tuples from all other destructive critical views
Weak correctness implies that actions specified by the policy must be meaningful
for the record itself and that the critical tuples will be promptly removed from the
view by applying α(R). Weak correctness by itself does not provide any guarantees
for termination of policy actions. This is because actions of a particular destruction
policy may introduce tuples in critical views of other destruction policies. Conse-
quently the notion of non-invasive policy actions is presented so that we can reason
about policy triggering patterns. Note that the scope of invasive policy actions is
not restricted in any way by the definition. Actions could themselves directly im-
pact other views or indirectly do so, for example as a side affect of several integrity
constraints such as cascading-deletes of foreign key references.
Lemma 4.1. A set of destruction policies P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn} is guaranteed to be
terminating, if the directed graph constructed with edges from Pi to Pj when Pi is
invasive with respect to Pj, has no cycles.
The above lemma specifies a strong condition that needs to be met to avoid
circular enforcement of retention destructive actions. Note that this result is very
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similar to the solutions presented to the classical problem of determining trigger ter-
mination and cyclic execution of rules [vdVS93, AWH92]. This result is also known
to be strictly stronger than what is minimally required for guaranteed termination
[LL99], since cyclic execution can also be shown to terminate if the execution depth
is bounded. However in our case, the likelihood of having bounded recursive depen-
dencies between business records is unlikely, therefore we adopt the simpler graph
theoretic approach to verify termination properties of destructive policy actions.
4.4 Weak Correctness
For arbitrarily defined views and enforcement actions statically determining if they
satisfy the above stated correctness criteria is undecideable. However if we consider
the class of updatable views specified by conjunctive queries, with actions limited
to deletion from specific base relations or overwriting with statically determined
values, we can efficiently show whether a policy is correct.
Lemma 4.2. For a record R specified as an updatable conjunctive view, a de-
structive retention policy P leading to critical view Vc with conditions Critical(Rp),
and a simple remedial action specified by α(R), P is weakly correct if and only if
Critical(Rp) ∧ αp(R) is unsatisfiable, where αp(R) is the post-condition of α(R).
When dealing with conjunctive views and simple actions as defined above, this
lemma states that we can easily check statically whether our policy actions are cor-
rect. In short we need to solve the satisfiability problem for the formula Critical(Rp)∧
αp(R) and can then be certain that enforcement is guaranteed if and only if this
formula is unsatisfiable. As an example of this, consider a simple record derived to
track credit card transactions over the following schema:
Transaction (TxnID, CstID, CardNumber, TxnDate, ... )
Customer (CstID, Name, ...)




where R1 = SELECT TxnID, CstID, CardNumber, TxnDate, ...
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FROM Transaction, Customer
WHERE Transaction.CstID = Customer.CstID
AND CardNumber IS NOT NULL
Example 4.2
DEFINE Obscure CardNumbers ON OldCreditCardTransactions
SET CardNumber = null
WHEN Days (NOW - TxnDate) > 365
In this scenario an organization is attempting to destroy credit card numbers
for transactions that took place more than a year ago. To accomplish this, on de-
tection of a non-empty critical view the specified action will set the CardNumber
attribute of the violating tuple to null. Note that in this case the logical condi-
tion for a tuple to be in the critical view, Critical(Rp), is (Transaction.CstID =
Customer.CstID) ∧ (CardNumber 6= null) ∧ (Days(NOW − TxnDate) > 365).
Thus the proof of compliance can simply be generated by solving the satisfiabil-
ity problem which combines the constraints of the critical view and the reme-
dial action, that is (Transaction.CstID = Customer.CstID) ∧ (CardNumber 6=
null)∧ (Days(NOW −TxnDate) > 365)∧ (CardNumber = null). Since we have a
contradiction on the attribute CardNumber, this formula is unsatisfiable implying
that there can not exist a tuple which can satisfy both Critical(Rp) and αp(R) at
the same time. Therefore we have effectively proven that the action α(R) when
applied to any tuple in the critical view will cause it to no longer persist in the
critical view. The reverse implication for this lemma is also trivially provable, for
if Critical(Rp) ∧ αp(R) is satisfiable, there can exist at least one tuple on which
performing the remedial action will not remove it from the relevant critical view,
and thus our policy action may fail to have any effect in that case.
This simple check allows us to be certain that the record lifecycle will always
terminate in destruction (defined as removal from the critical view) and more im-
portantly we can formally prove this by solving a problem which is at worst NP
complete. The fundamental observation to make is that, while we can not reason
about arbitrarily complex views and user programmed procedures, we can be cer-
tain about policy execution on a restricted set of views and actions. For updatable
conjunctive views and simple actions, we can determine statically at policy-creation
time whether there can exist a situation where our enforcement actions can fail to
provide the remedial effect. Consequently for a restricted class of relational records
we can now work objectively towards offering a formal proof of compliance.
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4.5 Integrity Preservation
It was mentioned earlier that to reason formally about retention policies and their
effect, we have to treat them as first class citizens in a database system. However,
actions performed by retention policies to rectify a policy violation should never
compromise the integrity of the database. In this section we will further refine our
notion of offering a proof of compliance to include integrity preservation.
Definition 4.4 (Integrity Preservation). A destructive policy P is integrity preserv-
ing if the suggested actions α(R) when applied to any valid instances of the database
d will also lead to a valid instance of the database with respect to all specified integrity
constraints.
Recall that one of the requirements for provable automated enforcement is that
the user programmed actions for enforcement should always (without exception)
terminate successfully. Note that this requirement is independent of the previously
discussed requirement of correctness and the actions having a remedial effect. For
example the actions taken in response to a policy violation may simply do nothing
and always terminate in the same valid database state as the one which has a
retention policy violation. We need to consider the word “exception” in a sense
similar to that used in programming environments, where it is quite often used
interchangeably with the notion of an error. One aspect of proving that enforcement
actions are always error-free is that of proving that they will never violate integrity
constraints. For example, let us assume that a user programmed procedure in
response to a policy violation attempts to delete a tuple in a relation that contains a
foreign key reference. There could be many reasons why this could happen, including
badly formed record definitions and poorly programmed actions. But unless we can
be certain that we will never encounter such a state, where user specified actions
cannot proceed without administrator intervention, we can not fully prove that our
policies are automatable.
Once again, offering such guarantees for arbitrarily defined views and actions
on them is impossible. It should also come as no surprise that the previously dis-
cussed restricted class of records specified by updatable conjunctive views and simple
actions on them can be restricted further to be made integrity preserving. We ex-
amine several types of integrity constraint and specify the restrictions that need to
be placed on simple actions for guaranteed integrity preservation. We will assume
that the database catalog is available to us so that we can make decisions regarding
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the legality of the user specified actions. Our aim is to pinpoint actions that can
cause integrity violations and detect them statically.
4.5.1 Primary Key and Uniqueness
One of the most significant problems (in terms of physical design related issues) in
data retention, is of a primary key constraint. In short all data contained in a tuple
cannot exist without the primary key uniquely identifying that data. Consequently
potential modifications such as setting primary key values of attributes to null or
other static values have to be rejected straightaway. To get rid of a primary key
value, the only option users have, is to delete the tuple from the base relation. It
follows that a uniqueness constraint on a tuple can also not be checked statically.
We can never be certain that a modification to an attribute that is specified in
the schema to be unique can always be legally done. Checks always need to be
performed on the particular instance of the database to ensure that the updated
value is unique and no universal guarantees that the actions will always complete
can be given for all instances of the database. Consequently users requiring a formal
proof of compliance must choose deletion of data in such situations.
4.5.2 Foreign Keys
Modifying foreign key attributes can often serve as a simple mechanism for data
destruction and simultaneous preservation of vital database statistics. To motivate
the application of modifying foreign key attributes and the associated intricacies,
consider the following database schema storing data about traffic violations:
Drivers:(LicenseNumber, FirstName, LastName)
Violations:(OffenseNumber, OffenseDescription)
Committed(LicenseNumber, OffenseNumber, OffenseDate, ...)
The interesting relation in the above example with foreign key references is one
which relates drivers with the traffic violations they committed. Let us further
assume that we have a legal retention requirement such that traffic violations are
removed from an individual’s driving record after 12 years from the OffenseDate.
However the statistics related to offenses should be maintained forever. When ob-
scuring or overwriting a foreign key value, there are two possible courses of action.
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If the foreign key attribute is nullable then it can always be set to null. However
there can be many cases where null is not suitable. The other option is that of
overwriting the foreign key value with a different but valid one. In the above scenario
we could introduce a privacy preserving entity in the drivers relation to accomplish
this. A privacy preserving entity can be informally described as an entity that does
not exist in the real world and its associated data is there only for obfuscation and
compliance with the existing schematic/integrity constraints. For example, a tuple
in the Drivers relation such as (“A1234-567890”,“Unknown”, “Person”) could be
used to refer to a driver that does not exist in the real world, but is there to support
anonymous storage (in the given design) of all traffic violations committed more
than 12 years ago. As soon as 12 years have past after a particular offense being
committed by a real driver, the LicenseNumber of that driver related to the offense
will be simply overwritten with “A1234-567890”. The following record definition
and constraint serve the scenario well:
Example 4.3
CommittedV iolations = {R1}
where R1 = SELECT * FROM Committed
Example 4.4
DEFINE ObscureOldViolations ON CommittedViolations
SET LicenseNumber = A1234-567890
WHEN Years (NOW - OffenseDate) > 12
AND LicenseNumber 6= A1234-567890
Note that “A1234-567890” is a statically determined value embedded in the
policy, and such static assignments of foreign key attributes have two major conse-
quences. Firstly we must ensure that “A1234-567890” should exist in the primary
relation at the time of policy instantiation, and secondly the system must mandate
that the statically used primary key of the privacy preserving entity (in our case
“A1234-567890”) will itself never be modified or deleted, thus ensuring that the
policy remains valid throughout its lifetime. In short, static assignment of foreign
key values in policy must introduce an implicit protective retention policy for the
primary key, in our case the entity identified by “A1234-567890” in the Drivers rela-
tion. This implicit constraint, which itself can be modeled as a protective retention
policy (See Chapter 3), ensures that the privacy preserving entities persist as long
as the referencing destruction policies are active.
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4.5.3 Other Issues in Integrity Preservation
Although in theory a set of delete/update actions can be shown to be error-free and
correct, it is significantly harder to make general claims in a typical database system.
One interesting complication in modern day database systems is the use of mecha-
nisms such as triggers and check-constraints to enforce complex user programmed
integrity constraints. With these additional procedures of arbitrary complexity in
place, it becomes harder to determine statically the consequence of actions taken
in response to policy violations. For example, if our attempts to remove outdated
records are rejected by a user programmed trigger, we will be unable to offer com-
pliance guarantees unless the trigger is removed (or suspended) and the remedial
actions repeated.
There is no easy way to resolve this issue. A tedious approach would be to
verify each user programmed trigger and check-constraint for sources of possible
interference with the data removal actions specified by retention policies. If the
number of user defined triggers is small and they are each of reasonable complexity,
this task can be done manually. However if we have to deal with a complicated web of
interrelated trigger-oriented events that can have side effects on the underlying data,
the task of proving that our retention actions will always work will be extremely
difficult. Trigger analysis and the verification of their properties such as termination
has been long studied in the database literature [Wid96, DKM86]. However, even
with the use of automated verification tools, proving strong properties for a large
number of complex triggers, with all policy actions can be a significant challenge.
Another approach is to circumvent the problem by arguing that not only are
retention policies first class citizens but they also have special privileges that allow
them to bypass the invocation of triggers. What this means is that the monitoring of
triggers and user programmed integrity constraints will be temporarily suspended
when actions specified by a retention policy are being executed. Thus user pro-
grammed integrity constraints could be demoted to second class citizens in such
scenarios. However the burden of being kind to user programmed integrity con-
straints will then be placed on retention policy actions. We also note that due to
the complexities associated with triggers such as non-standard semantics and be-
haviour among database vendors, execution ordering, recursive execution, lack of a
guarantee of termination, and resource consumption issues, they are often avoided
by database programmers [SD95, CCW00]. Consequently this approach may be
favorable in situations where the number of triggers present in a database system is
limited.
40
While on the one hand disregarding triggers can instantly solve our problem of
provably enforcing retention, on the other hand it may lead to unexpected results if
the retention actions are badly designed. For example, if retention policies violate
user programmed integrity constraints, user applications may be misled to make
incorrect assumptions about the data. The core conflict here is between database
administrators and records managers to determine which comes first, non-essential
integrity or proof of compliance. Of course, if a formal proof and immediate deletion
of outdated records are not critical requirements, conflicts between integrity and
retention policy actions can always be resolved in favor of maintaining integrity. If
the window of compliance is sufficiently large, we can always revert to the ad-hoc
approach of conflict resolution where the violation is reported to a human arbitrator
for review, who can then decide how to proceed further.
4.6 Schema and Policy Set Evolution
It is important to remind the reader that implementations of retention policies using
views as abstraction for records are only interpretations of the legal data retention
requirements for a given storage schema. If a change in the schema invalidates the
previous interpretations (view definitions), it does not absolve the business from its
records management obligations. Simply consulting the corporate privacy enforce-
ment officer to reinterpret the affected records retention policies for the new schema
is the recommended approach. However some transformative actions or policies may
not allow the flexibility of a change in the storage of records. Similarly when new
policies are being introduced, privacy administrators may not want to enforce new
policies retroactively.
In such cases there may arise the need to maintain two parallel versions of the
storage schema in order to fulfill obligations on the older schema as time progresses.
The older snapshot of the database would not be used for actively inserting new
business records, but rather only for fulfilling records management obligations on
the records it contained at the time of the schema change. The deprecated schema
and the data therein can only be safely discarded when all obligations as specified
by relevant policy actions have been met. In situations where these requirements
cannot be ported to the new schema, there is no choice but to maintain records
until all of them have completed their lifecycle and no more policy actions will be





In this chapter we further develop our notion of proof of compliance to include
detection of inter-policy conflicts. We examine a procedure to detect overlapping
and conflicting policies statically for simple records defined as conjunctive queries.
A discussion of the various sources of conflicts is also presented which highlights
how they can be avoided through the use of good physical design combined with
precise and meaningful record definitions. We also present the results of our tests
conducted that demonstrate that the overhead of our proposed records retention
framework can easily be minimized in a typical business situation. We conclude
this chapter by comparing our presented solution to data retention with existing
approaches in the realm of ECM and privacy aware information systems.
5.1 Inter-Policy Conflicts
5.1.1 Detecting Conflicts
The final requirement for proving correctness for a set of policies that we examine is
to show that they are consistent and conflict free. Inter-policy conflicts are basically
caused by expired data that is to be removed or modified according to a destruction
policy and is also at the same time protected under a protection policy. We call
these delete-protect conflicts between policies and define them using the previously
developed notion of invasive policies.
Definition 5.1 (Conflict Free Policies). A destruction policy D is conflict free with
respect to a protection policy P if D is non-invasive with respect to P.
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In other words if the actions specified by a destructive policy can not impact
the critical view of a protective policy then the two policies are guaranteed not to
conflict with each other. In the context of database theory, the problem is reduced to
that of determining whether a given update (destruction policy action) is irrelevant
to a given relational expression (protected critical view). Note that our definition
of invasive policies, in the context of cyclic execution of destruction events and
conflicting policy actions, is essentially a specialization of Blakely’s definition of
irrelevant updates [BCL89]. If an update is irrelevant to a critical view defined by a
policy, then that update can not impact the contents of the critical view regardless
of the database state.
We can thus safely claim that detection of delete-protect conflicts is equivalent to
determining whether modifications caused by destruction policies are irrelevant to
critical views of protective policies. Furthermore detecting conflicts among simple
select-project-join view based records is only NP-hard whereas in the general case
detecting conflicts is undecideable. To prove total correctness we have to show that
all pairs {P,D}, where P is a protection policy and D is a destruction policy, are
conflict free. We point out that testing for policy conflicts is a one-time and offline
cost incurred at policy instantiating time.
5.1.2 Source of Conflicts
There are two major reasons why conflicting policies can be introduced in any data
retention framework. Firstly, retention requirements as stated may inherently be
conflicting among themselves. To distinguish these conflicts from other types of
conflicts, we call them direct policy conflicts. Trivially we can see that direct policy
conflicts will always lead to delete-protect conflicts. Such conflicts are more likely
to occur if policies written independently by various governing bodies are to be
implemented on the same database. However for most small-medium businesses
that are subject to laws from one country/authority direct policy conflicts will be
relatively rare.
The primary source of delete-protect conflicts is the translation from policies
stated in natural language to the implementation mechanism that we proposed in
this thesis. Recall that in our discussion of ECM systems, the definition of a record
was very simple and already given to us. In ECM systems a record is basically a self-
contained file residing on a disk. Whether the file represents an email, a document or
a spreadsheet is irrelevant because the notion of record in that scenario is very well
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defined. Most importantly a record (file) is atomic and its data can not overlap with
another record in the system. Consequently conflicts arising through the shared use
of data between multiple records do not exist in ECM systems. The only source
of conflicts in ECM systems is cross-classification at the level of complete objects,
for example a spreadsheet could be shared between two different departments of
an organization that have two different retention policies for their spreadsheets.
Similarly the only destruction action that ECM systems support is simple and self-
contained deletion of the entire record and these deletions do not have any side
effects such as cascading deletes of other records.
In relational database systems neither pre-defined mapping between records and
data nor pre-defined destruction policy actions exist. There is a wide variety of
options available through which protection/destruction of sensitive data can be ac-
complished. Consequently the task of choosing the best possible record definitions
and destructive actions is significantly more challenging than in ECM systems.
5.2 Conflict Avoidance
A database administrator must first identify all records on which policies are to
be enforced. More specifically, given a physical schema the administrator has to
enumerate all queries that generate records that need to be protected/destroyed
according to a retention policy. In a way this task is similar to that of organizational
work-flow management, and all aspects of good record design used for business
documents can also be used by the database administrator. For example, it would be
inefficient to design a spreadsheet such that two different departments of a business
work with totally disjoint parts of the spreadsheet. Just as it would make sense to
split the single sheet into two separate and independently lock-able parts, it would
also make sense that the database administrator enumerate queries defining records
such that they have minimal overlapping data between them.
Based on our discussion in previous chapters, we argue that the single most
important factor in determining the number of policy conflicts is the precision of
record definitions. Direct translation of policies from an ECM system to our re-
lational framework will lead to very broad record definitions and thus should be
avoided. For example, if a telecommunications company is required to keep track
of destinations of the calls placed by its subscribers, it would be unwise to take the
ECM approach and enforce retention policies on queries that specify entire telephone
bills. For such physical records the administrator has to identify very precisely parts
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Figure 5.1: An ideal scenario where a set of policies is translated into record defini-
tions and policy actions programmed by a single administrator. Even if conflicting
policies are present, the same administrator can always re-interpret the set of given
policies to resolve conflicts.
of each document that can contain sensitive data and the queries that minimally
capture that data over all similar records. This means accessing only the required
relations in record definitions and having as selective predicates on policy actions
as possible. Typically the ability to accomplish this will directly depend upon the
quality of the physical design of the database. For example the ability to reduce the
number of joins in record definitions to a minimum directly depends on the given
normal form of a schema and a well normalized schema can substantially reduce the
number of overlapping records definitions.
In an ideal scenario (depicted in Figure 5.1) a single policy maker will consoli-
date various policies into one database. However for large multinational businesses
encompassing various federated databases, it is unlikely that there will be a sin-
gle expert that will translate all retention requirements into record definitions and
protection/destruction actions. In such situations (depicted in Figure 5.2 on Page
47) the likelihood of conflicts increases significantly and all conflicts have to be
ultimately resolved/mediated between the respective policy administrators.
Conflicts in policies need not arise directly because of data shared among records.
In our examples we have largely discussed the use of select-project-join based views
to define records. The elegance of these simple records can be misleading and it may
give the illusion of making records management very easy. For more complex records,
such as those that use operators such as intersection and union, understanding the









































































































































































































































































































the use of the negation operator between two relations X1 and X2, each with a single
attribute called id and two record definitions, R1 which selects all id’s in X1 that
are not in X2, and R2 which selects all id’s in X2 that are not in X1. Note that
by definition R1 and R2 are always disjoint (R1 ∩ R2 = ∅) but the data/definitions
of R1 and R2 are inseparable. Performing actions (insertions and deletions) on any
of these records will most certainly have a direct impact on the other. We have
repeatedly stressed the need to keep record definition “simple”; unfortunately we
claim that it is impossible to formally define the notion of simplicity for arbitrary
queries. This is because any definition of a simple query language may disallow
certain policies to be enforceable. Simplicity of record definitions and policies is
largely an abstract concept and a function of a database administrator’s confidence
in the meaning of each relational expression used to identify records for policy
enforcement. Adopting a conservative approach and keeping to conjunctive queries
only may not be a feasible approach for all situations. The only critical requirement
that needs to be met for good record/policy design, is that administrators need to
fully understand record definitions and the actions of their policies.
5.3 Implementation
Our framework for continuous records monitoring can best be summarized as a
proposal for active integrity constraints and actions on views. We assert that the
task of periodically monitoring destructive critical views and purging records will
not be a significant source of performance degradation in our model. This is because
of the temporal flexibility available in destructive data retention requirements and
the fact that stricter versions of destructive policies can usually be enforced. For
example, this flexibility allows us to execute daily or weekly batch jobs that enforce
destructive retention policies without interfering with the online operation of the
database system.
However if a record is accidentally deleted when it is supposed to be protected by
an organization, the consequences are more serious. Naturally, there is no flexibility
in protecting records and every modification to a database has to be checked against
the relevant policies to ensure compliance. Consequently the cost of computing
the effect of updates on protected records will be the most significant source of
overhead. In light of this fact, the aim of our experiments is twofold: first, to
measure the overhead of continuous record protection precisely for a broad mix of
protective policies in a high-update and heavily regulated business scenario; second,
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Figure 5.3: A summary of the policies. The critical row coverage represents the
proportion of order and lineitem tuples that were relevant to a specific policy. The
type denotes the complexity of the critical view being denoted as simple/on a sin-
gle relation (S), conjunctive/involving multiple base relations (C) or involving an
aggregate value (A).
to determine and recommend means of minimizing this overhead using features
already present in existing database systems.
There are two widely used mechanisms to detect events specified by arbitrary
relational expressions (such as a tuple becoming critical) in database systems: incre-
mental computation or total re-computation. More specifically, to detect changes
in the contents of a critical view, we can either materialize the view completely and
implement triggers on the materialized view (a feature present in some commercial
systems such as Oracle) or implement triggers on base relations that detect (pos-
sibly after execution of an additional query) whether the relevant critical view will
be impacted by a triggering statement [CW91]. A detailed examination of imple-
menting triggers on views, including an algorithm for mapping triggers on views to
an equivalent set of triggers on base relations, has been presented in the literature
[SNS06].
We note that for monitoring views and the effect of every update on views, there
are two well known optimizations that can be exploited to reduce the associated
overhead. First, we can benefit from the observation that certain policies and event
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detection on the associated views naturally favor a particular mechanism. For ex-
ample using triggers to monitor a view with an aggregate value is ill-advised, given
that this value will not be preserved after the trigger invocation and will require
total re-computation at every relevant update. Therefore it would be prudent to
selectively decide on materialization or re-computation for policies such that the
relative overhead for each policy is minimized. Generally, the decision to materi-
alize or re-compute depends on the average cost incurred per relevant update, and
most database optimizers can quite easily assess the cost of a typical update and re-
computation query, to give a reasonable estimate of which technique will be better
than the other. Second, we can use to our benefit the fact that several policies can
quite often be clustered around a small number of related tables. Instead of instan-
tiating a large number triggers on base relations, the approach of trigger grouping
[HCH+99, SNS06] can be used to reduce the number of triggers per table and to
exploit the fact that multiple policies on similar predicates can be checked in a sin-
gle trigger invocation. The result of these optimizations can lead to a significant
reduction in the cost of view monitoring. Instead of incurring worst case costs of
each monitoring mechanism (views and triggers), we can combine these into a hy-
brid critical view monitoring technique which attempts to take advantages of the
positive aspects of both approaches.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
For our tests we relied on the TPC-H (Transaction Processing Council- Benchmark
H) schema depicting a business scenario involving the sale of parts to customers
worldwide. We developed 12 different protective data retention policies and trans-
lated them into relevant views that would need to be monitored. These policies
were directly derived from real-world records retention requirements imposed on
TPC-H like businesses by various security, export and taxation agencies. Examples
of such policies include protecting purchase orders involving the sale of special parts
like uranium fuel rods, protecting order details with suspiciously large monetary
sums, and protecting sales tax totals for specific countries. A detailed list of these
policies, the synthetic parameters and the relevant views is given in Appendix A.
Our policy set consisted of 3 simple policies on single relations, 6 policies leading to
the monitoring of conjunctive views and 3 policies which involved protection of an
aggregate amount. Although the majority of these policies individually had a low
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Figure 5.4: Average completion (commit) time for an update to a single tuple in a
base relation protected under a single policy implemented using triggers over base
relations and using the incremental maintenance approach. The horizontal line
represents the cost of an update without any monitoring mechanisms in place.
in base relations, all tuples were protected against modifications from at least one
policy (Figure 5.3).
Due to the nature of the TPC-H schema, most of the policies were clustered
around the two largest tables in the schema (Orders and Lineitem). We believe that
this will be a standard observation in databases used by highly regulated businesses,
as these regulations can be expected to be uni-faceted and will certainly be based
on the primary function of the business. For example, compared to a database
maintained by a large stock-broker, a medical database used by a hospital will
likely be subject to more retention obligations for patient and treatment records
than for the financial records of the hospital. Therefore it is natural to expect that
a large number of policies will be clustered around relatively few tables and, as we
describe shortly, several avenues of optimization arise because of this observation.
Our tests were conducted using a 1GB dataset on ab Intel Core 2 Duo (1.8Ghz)
machine with 1.5GB of RAM. All tests were performed on a warm database using
DB2 v9.5 and involved issuing several thousand (typically 5000 or more) individual
update statements on base relations that impact critical views defined by protective
retention policies. The standard error in measured wall-clock response times in our
tests was usually less than 5% of the average time to commit for an update.
Figure 5.4 summarizes the results of the overhead incurred by each of the 12























Figure 5.5: The scalability of incremental and total re-computation in detecting
changes in the contents of critical views. The values on the x-axis represent the
total number of protective policies being enforced on the database. For example at
7, Policies 1 through 7 are all being enforced at the same time.
as a materialized view. All updates were performed randomly over the dataset (each
tuple was equally likely to be modified). Policies involving aggregated information
(for example, policies 10, 11 and 12) clearly favor incremental computation, whereas
for other policies the maintenance overhead caused by materialization is far greater
than simple checking of updates for relevance.
The reason for triggers individually performing better than materialized views
for event detection is largely due to the TPC-H schema and specifications. For
example a purchase order in the TPC-H schema is related to only one customer,
nation and region. Furthermore, the data contained in any purchase order includes
at most seven line items. Consequently the majority of the simple policy decisions
on updates pertaining to individual purchase orders can be made by examining a
small number of tuples. It is only when repetitive re-computation of aggregates
takes place that triggers pay a heavy price.
Figure 5.5 demonstrates how both the incremental and total re-computation
approaches scale independently as more and more policies are implemented. Ma-
terialization suffers from the overhead of view maintenance whereas triggers have
scalability issues arising from one policy on a view being translated into multiple
triggers on base tables. For maintaining efficiency in transaction processing most
commercial database systems limit the number of triggers that can be instantiated























Figure 5.6: The scalability of the hybrid approaches to event detection on views.
The values on the x-axis represent the total number of protective policies being
enforced on the database. For example at 7, Policies 1 through 7 are all being
enforced at the same time.
dealing with a large number of policies, triggers would be able to accommodate
the monitoring of all protective views. Note that the policies where triggers incur
a high overhead are deliberately introduced as the last three policies in the mix.
Thus the figure seems to favor the use of triggers for record monitoring. However
the total cost associated with monitoring all policies using triggers is far greater
than that of using materialized views. This is simply because of the high cost of
repetitive re-computation of aggregates over a large amount of data. The addition
of a single policy (Policy 12), which is intended to protect the aggregated total of
all orders as long as the total remains under a certain maximum, makes the use
of triggers for view monitoring infeasible. We deliberately delayed introducing this
policy in the mix to ensure meaningful presentation of results. Had this policy been
introduced as the first policy in the mix, the results would have been very differ-
ent. The more important observation is that, neither triggers nor incremental view
maintenance, can in general work well for monitoring a broad variety of views. The
overhead incurred for monitoring all policies at the same time was a factor of 30
using incremental computation approach and roughly a factor of 1350 for triggers
when compared against no monitoring of updates.
The results in Figure 5.6 demonstrate that simply choosing the correct and more
suited event monitoring mechanism for each policy can substantially reduce the cost
associated with monitoring critical views. The plain hybrid strategy, which simply
chooses between triggers or materialization, performs better than either technique
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alone. However it still suffers from having to instantiate a large of number triggers
which greatly reduces its scalability. Since the TPC-H schema is relatively compact,
and the fact that a large number of our policies revolve around the order and lineitem
tables, trigger grouping provides a much more significant improvement in response
times by minimizing the number of trigger invocations per update on a base table.
We note that there are bound to be differences between our tests and real world
scenarios. However we claim that these differences will not degrade performance
in a large number of cases. The foremost difference will be that of a non-random
model for updates where all protected tuples are not equally likely to be modified.
As noted earlier many businesses do not actively modify temporally stable records
(for example very old purchase orders). Consequently the use of temporal/range
based indexing and partitioning may substantially reduce monitoring costs. Second
we note that our tests were done using unrealistically high record coverage and while
certain database applications such as those keeping track of medical histories will be
highly regulated, typical coverage can be expected to be lower than what we tested
against.
In practice we recommend that the decision to use a particular strategy for
monitoring views be made by the query optimizer after considering the expected
number of policy violations, expected number of relevant updates, level of temporal
stability exhibited by records and types of views to be monitored. Given a particular
workload, modern database systems are able to recommend materializations of views
that can improve query performance. Much of the infrastructure to measure the
cost and benefit of incremental computation of views versus re-computation costs
of queries already exists. Therefore we believe that by using these existing features
a “retention policy advisor” can be built such that given a set of record definitions,
protective policies on records and an expected workload profile, the best monitoring
mechanism can be easily determined. We acknowledge that as the expressiveness of
critical views and the complexity of actions specified (perhaps as stored procedures)
increases, so will the overhead of having a view/tuple protective data retention
framework. The work done by Blakely et al. in the area of views attempted to
detect irrelevant updates statically by only examining the view definition and a
given update. However more than two decades’ research into views has made modern
database systems capable of exploiting a large range of available information, such
as functional dependencies and materialized views, for detecting irrelevant updates.
Although there is the remote possibility of encountering the worst case cost of re-
computation of a critical view at every modification to the database, we argue
that no other existing mechanism in relational databases (such as triggers or access
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control features) will in general be able to avoid such costs.
Finally there is the cost of static analysis of policies. We believe that tasks
such as detection of conflicts, and proving termination properties for destructive
actions can largely be mechanized. Even though the run time of most algorithms to
accomplish this will be exponential, and human intervention may still be required,
these costs will be one-time only. Laws pertaining to retention do not change very





The Broader Picture in Records
Retention
We conclude this thesis by comparing our proposed framework to existing solutions
and then examining several broad-ranging issues related to data retention in and
beyond the scope of relational databases. We examine various problems pertaining
to retention of distributed and offline data. Possible remedial steps that can be
taken to mitigate these problems are then discussed.
6.1 Existing Solutions
There are several software based ECM management solutions that manage a wide
variety of records such as emails and documents. Unfortunately, we have not seen
a similar solution for records management in relational database management sys-
tems. There are several storage management solutions such as Tivoli (IBM) and
StorageWorks (HP) that can make regular backups of entire databases and sub-
sequently delete them at specified periods of time. However to the best of our
knowledge there exists no published solution nor a comprehensive examination of
issues pertaining to records management in relational database systems.
It is evident that industry and academia are well aware of the problems in the
store-everything approach with databases. However databases are very much still
treated as coarse structures similar to files. Several papers published in technical
conferences have stressed the need for proper frameworks for data retention, but
none have gone beyond the surface to explain how their vision will be implemented.
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Privacy policy specification languages such as P3P [AHKS02] and EPAL [And06]
also have support for retention tags for data, but they do not address fundamental
issues such as how these tags will be used in various situations.
More closely related, but equally vague, descriptions of how retention features in
database systems can be implemented are briefly mentioned in the work of Agarwal
et al. [AKSX02, ABG+05]. Unfortunately not much is described in these papers
other than IBM’s long term vision for Hippocratic/Privacy-aware databases. HP’s
vision for management of privacy and data retention related obligations is described
in the academic literature [MT06b, MT05, MT06a]. However the solution that they
outline is an attempt to monitor privacy obligations enterprise-wide using an elabo-
rate central obligation monitoring system. It can best be described as a systematic
way of scheduling events throughout all corporate data repositories such that the
execution of these events will ensure compliance with all privacy obligations. Such
a technique is rather näıve and more importantly it is very inefficient. It fails to rec-
ognize that checking of policy violations can be best done at the source of the data,
and at the same time as updates are applied to the data. Consequently we believe
that an external one-size-fits-all solution to enterprise wide privacy obligation mon-
itoring along with storage of the different what-if scenarios to deal with situations,
will not scale up for high performance database systems. Although we propose a
database oriented record monitoring system, our work is also somewhat orthogonal
in the sense that it does not assume existence of pre-defined mechanisms/procedures
in a database that are guaranteed to be correct and lead to a privacy friendly state
after their execution.
It seems that prior work has generally failed to address the question of what is
a record in relational database systems, acknowledge that retention requirements
can be both protective and destructive, and observe there are several issues specific
to database systems, such as dependencies among data and their retention require-
ments, that need to be considered. From our review of the literature we believe
that there is a common misconception that attaching a timestamp to every piece of
data in a system denoting its expiry will solve all problems. Stated differently, this
is very much the ECM approach to classifying data into different categories based
on the retention obligations. Unfortunately such a solution is clearly infeasible for
large-scale relational databases.
Firstly we note that the granularity of data at which a timestamp oriented tech-
nique can be applied can not be universally specified. Records retention policies are
typically defined by authorities without considering any specific database schema.
Consequently the foremost shortcoming of this metadata approach is that it does
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Figure 6.1: Simply associating an expiry timestamp with every piece of data can
increase the storage requirements by a large factor.
not answer the question of where these timestamps will come from and how they
will be specified. Our framework on the other hand addresses these question di-
rectly. Secondly we note that attaching a retention timestamp to every tuple, or
even worse to every attribute of every tuple, is a very space inefficient method of
keeping track of retention obligations (See Figure 6.1). Such an approach is only
workable for simple and well defined objects, such as files, and in situations where
storing a timestamp has a relatively insignificant cost compared to the storage of the
record. Our proposed solution on the other hand implicitly stores these timestamps
as a policy expressed over the structure of records.
Not only does the timestamp approach ignore functional dependencies among
individual pieces of data, but it is also blind to the fact that retention obligations
may themselves be related to each other. If the time at which a record is to be
deleted is dependent on factors such as the last time the record itself was updated,
then we run into the additional problems of maintaining and keeping up-to-date the
particular retention timestamp in question. Furthermore timestamps themselves
do not provide adequate expressiveness for typical temporal retention conditions.
Lastly, the motivation for most published work in this area comes from providing
enhanced privacy guarantees to customers and external observers. Most research
into privacy aims to improve the state of the art in privacy enhancing technolo-
gies for the greater good of the public and not the corporate records management
team. Therefore the end goal is not compliance with minimum retention periods but
rather to ensure that private information is protected and not retained indefinitely
in organizational databases. Consequently the problem of managing and enforc-
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Email Management Our Framework
Records Emails with Attachments Tuples in the view “R” defined




Emails that have to be retained
until some condition is met
Tuples in a critical view of a pro-
tection policy on R
Expired
Records
Emails that have delete as soon
as possible
Tuples in a critical view of a de-
struction policy on R
Policy En-
forcement
Monitoring all emails that are
created or destroyed against all
policies
Maintenance of critical views
and detecting relevant updates
Figure 6.2: A comparison of how records management is accomplished in a typi-
cal central email storage/monitoring system against how it would be done in our
framework.
ing minimum retention periods for internal operational business records is largely
ignored in the literature.
Our proposed framework suffers no such shortcomings. We recognize that unlike
ECM systems, which manage files and data objects like email messages, there are no
boundaries for records in databases that can be used in all situations. Consequently
we have introduced a novel way to tackle the problem such that users can themselves
define records and enforce policy actions that they deem fit. Although our proposed
framework shares the same fundamental objectives with modern ECM systems (see
Figure 6.2 for a comparison) it is much more flexible than any existing mechanism
for managed records retention.
6.2 Guaranteed Destruction of Records
6.2.1 Backups and Offline Databases
The problem of indefinite retention of backed up data was first discussed up by
Boneh and Lipton [BL96]. They observed that even with the use of a privacy
aware systems that delete all expired data, offline backups (for example on tapes)
can lead to sensitive information persisting indefinitely. In order to avoid the cost
of physically mounting backups and deleting expired records, they proposed that
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all sensitive information be encrypted before being backed up. When the data
expires, simply deleting the encryption key (which itself is not stored alongside the
backup) will effectively make the data irrecoverable for all intents and purposes. An
examination of the problem of hierarchical key management was presented in their
work, and they concluded that this technique can be repeatedly applied, even to
backup keys themselves. However the most recent encryption key must be preserved
with care. Their solution suggested that this master key must either be physically
written down or protected through escrow, and then subsequently destroyed when
another key replaces it. Although this technique is very practical, it is unlikely
that the problem associated with making backups of the current master key can
be resolved. If in a disaster situation the master key is lost, we effectively lose all
backups of our data. On the other hand keeping copies of the master key induces
risk of accidental retention of that key itself.
6.2.2 Distributed Systems
Data retention issues in distributed environments are far more complex than those
for stand-alone systems. We define the retention problem in distributed systems as
the problem of provably deleting a particular identifiable piece of data throughout
a distributed system. The aim is to offer a reasonable probabilistic guarantee that
records that may be replicated and/or partitioned over an arbitrary network are
deleted when the necessary conditions are met. There are numerous models under
which this problem can be studied. For example, in networks where nodes join
and leave intermittently, the ability to guarantee with reasonable certainty that a
particular delete request will propagate to all nodes has been examined [BCK+06].
Changing various parameters of the network and properties of nodes, such as assign-
ing owners of data, introducing trust models for data exchange, and even including
adversaries with limited storage in the network, can all lead to interesting reten-
tion scenarios. Unfortunately much of this work is spread across various aspects of
computing research. Different research communities have published their results in
separate contexts, such as in peer-to-peer data management systems [DHA03], dis-
tributed file systems [BCK+06], and of course in distributed database management
systems [DGH+87]. As much as we would like to direct the reader of this report
to a survey of such papers, there exists no comprehensive review of the literature
that unifies work done in distributed data management for enforcing mechanisms
for limited data retention.
61
6.2.3 Unwarranted Data Retention
Several issues in data retention arise simply because the concept of deleting data
has a different meaning in different contexts. For example environments such as
file systems that support “undeletion” provide a very vague explanation to users of
what deletion means. It is a well known fact that deletion in file systems implies
nothing more than simple removal of pointers to give the illusion of deletion and
available free space. In order to avoid the overhead of writing zeroes to disk, most
file systems leave files recoverable, through physical examination of sectors on disks.
We believe that similar forensic examination of deletion in various storage systems
will reveal equally interesting results.
Most of these cases of unwarranted data retention arise because of the mismatch
between user perception and system actions. Furthermore, it is interesting that the
problem of unwarranted data retention goes beyond the realm of software and even
storage systems. For example, modern day fax machines have convenience features
that allow users the ability to re-send faxes that were sent earlier, by retaining them
in large storage buffers. Whether users are aware of such features (their presence
or their being activated) is rarely a significant issue in the design of user interfaces.
While designing user oriented systems, whether they are web browsers or operating
systems, convenience and performance have traditionally trumped privacy. The fact
that traditional mechanisms for improving performance such as buffering, caching
and replication were all designed without considering privacy related issues has very
disturbing implications. Consequently we anticipate that a top down examination
of various data oriented systems will reveal that unwarranted retention of data is a
much bigger problem than it seems. In the context of forensic analysis of database
systems, a comprehensive examination of issues was presented very recently by
Stahlberg et al. [SML07]. They observed that database systems are notoriously
misleading when it comes to deletion of data. The use of deletion bits instead of
overwriting with zeroes and persistence of data in transaction logs and indexes are
a few of the many problems associated with unexpected data retention in relational
database systems.
6.3 Future Work
Apart from examining various problems in distributed systems and sources of inad-
vertent data retention, there is a wide array of topics in the field of records manage-
ment that can be explored in the future. Instead of briefly touching on divergent
62
issues such as XML databases and support for retention in other areas, we suggest
one critical problem in computer science that desperately needs more attention from
database researchers.
A problem which has generally been ignored in relational database systems is the
issue of ownership of data and rights over it. Several interesting problems emerge
when data from multiple sources/owners is integrated into one database system,
especially if these owners want to ensure different (retention) policies on their data.
Database systems assume that all data contained within them is owned by one single
authority. Typically a system administrator represents that authority and he/she
can grant various users rights over data. In situations involving Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) or data import/export between organizations, a database system
has no functionality of respecting the policies and rules on it that the original owner
wished to enforce.
In the context of privacy preserving systems, this inseparability of data and
policies on it is widely known as the sticky policy paradigm. The problem is sim-
ilar to that of Digital Rights Management in the realm of anti music/file sharing
technologies. No storage system that we are aware of has adequate support for en-
forcing privacy policies and supporting interchange of data and policy at the same
time. However as people become more aware of the privacy implications of data
interchange between large scale database systems, providing a mechanism for sup-
porting ownership and portability of policies in databases will become of extreme
importance. Organizations such as the United States Department of Defense have
already started taking data exchange issues very seriously and perform regular audits
of their sub-contractors’ computer systems. Therefore research into this area from
a database perspective certainly has value. Once again it is questionable whether
attaching an ownership/policy tag to every piece of data will be a workable solu-
tion for high performance database systems. Consequently we believe that a better
approach would be to develop a framework similar in nature to ours, where records
and ownership are defined using a flexible granularity, as the basis for a database
system that truly supports the sticky policy paradigm. However there are numerous
other issues that arise in EDI, such as ensuring that the set of policies among data
exchanging parties are non-conflicting and determining whether policies enforced
by one party are stronger or weaker than the other. Even more complications can
occur when records are built on top of data jointly owned by different parties.
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6.4 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis we examined the problem of managed records retention in relational
database systems. We recognized that no definition of a record will be universally
applicable over relational data, and näıve solutions of expiry-tagging will be far too
inefficient to scale up for high performance database systems. Consequently we pro-
posed a novel way of looking at records as relational expressions, which subsequently
allowed us to reduce challenges associated with policy enforcement to several well
studied problems in database theory. We believe that our methodology of looking
at policies beyond the level of rows and attributes makes the task of specifying
and controlling policies over complex records much simpler for the average records
manager. A framework for monitoring and enforcing data retention policies on view
based records was presented, along with a comprehensive discussion of formal prop-
erties such as conflicts and termination can be verified. Our framework has the
benefit of being not only space efficient but it is also capable of leveraging well
known results in database theory to improve performance of records management
tasks. From our analysis of a wide range of features in relational systems such
as triggers, access control and view maintenance, we believe that our view based




Policy Descriptions and View
Definitions (DB2)
A.1 Policy 1
Parts 500-525, 999 and 1001 are parts used for nuclear weapons and fuel enrichment.
All orders with line items which include the sale of the above parts must never be
updated. Other line items in these orders must also be protected.
A.1.1 View Definition
CREATE TABLE P1 AS
(













WHERE L2.L ORDERKEY = O ORDERKEY
AND O ORDERKEY = L1.L ORDERKEY
AND
(
L1.L PARTKEY = 999
OR L1.L PARTKEY = 1001
OR (L1.L PARTKEY >= 500 AND L1.L PARTKEY <= 525)
)
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P1;
A.1.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER NUCLEAR PARTS
BEFOREUPDATE OFO COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROWNEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM LINEITEM
WHERE L ORDERKEY = OLD ROW.O ORDERKEY
AND (L PARTKEY = 999
OR L PARTKEY = 1001






A.1.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER NUCLEAR PARTS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
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REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL
WHEN
(OLD ROW.L PARTKEY = 999
OR OLD ROW.L PARTKEY = 1001





Protect all orders from Kenya with total price more than 150000.
A.2.1 View Definition











C CUSTKEY = O CUSTKEY
AND C NATIONKEY = N NATIONKEY
AND N NATIONKEY = 14
AND O TOTALPRICE > 150000
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P2;
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A.2.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER KENY AN ORDERS
BEFORE UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM CUSTOMER, NATION
WHERE C CUSTKEY = OLD ROW.O CUSTKEY
AND C NATIONKEY = N NATIONKEY
AND N NATIONKEY = 14






A.2.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATETRIGGER KENY AN ORDERS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM CUSTOMER, NATION,ORDERS
WHERE C CUSTKEY = O CUSTKEY AND C NATIONKEY = N NATIONKEY
AND N NATIONKEY = 14
AND O TOTALPRICE > 150000








Protect orders beyond a large total price of (300,000). Note that this policy implies
that we are doubly protecting the Kenyan orders and all large orders
A.3.1 View Definition











O TOTALPRICE >= 300000 AND O ORDERKEY = L ORDERKEY
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P3;
A.3.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER LARGE ORDERS
BEFORE UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL
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WHEN (OLD ROW.O TOTALPRICE > 30000)
BEGIN ATOMIC
END
A.3.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER LARGE ORDERS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM ORDERS
WHERE OLD ROW.L ORDERKEY = O ORDERKEY







Parts 3000-10000 are fertilizers that can be used to make explosives. Any order
which contains a line item with quantity greater than 10 units of these part should
be protected along with the lineitems.
A.4.1 View Definition












O ORDERKEY = L ORDERKEY
AND L PARTKEY >= 3000
AND L PARTKEY <= 10000
AND L QUANTITY > 10
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P4;
A.4.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER TNT ORDERS
BEFORE UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM LINEITEM
WHERE L ORDERKEY = OLD ROW.O ORDERKEY






A.4.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER TNT ORDERS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL
WHEN (
OLD ROW.L PARTKEY >= 3000
AND OLD ROW.L PARTKEY <= 10000




Protect a new category of orders called “ULTRA URGENT”. Execute the following
query to set a fair number of orders to this priority:
UPDATE ORDERS
SET O ORDERPRIORITY = “− 1− ULTRA URGENT”
WHERE O ORDERPRIORITY = “1− URGENT”
AND MOD(O ORDERKEY, 5) = 0
A.5.1 View Definition













O ORDERPRIORITY = “− 1− ULTRA URGENT”
AND O ORDERKEY = L ORDERKEY
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P5;
A.5.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER URGENT ORDERS
BEFORE UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL
WHEN (OLD ROW.O ORDERPRIORITY = “− 1− ULTRA URGENT”)
BEGIN ATOMIC
END
A.5.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER URGENT ORDERS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM ORDERS
WHERE OLD ROW.L ORDERKEY = O ORDERKEY








Protect orders with orderstatus “P”.
A.6.1 View Definition












O ORDERSTATUS = “P”
AND O ORDERKEY = L ORDERKEY
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P6;
A.6.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER P ORDERS
AFTER UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL




A.6.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER P ORDERS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM ORDERS
WHERE OLD ROW.L ORDERKEY = O ORDERKEY







Create a new Lineitem status “P”. Assign this status to every 20th lineitem, then
protect all orders which contain such a lineitem: UPDATE LINEITEM
SET L LINESTATUS = “P”
WHERE MOD(L ORDERKEY, 20) = 0
A.7.1 View Definition













L LINESTATUS = “P” AND O ORDERKEY = L ORDERKEY
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P7;
A.7.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER P LINEITEMS
AFTER UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM LINEITEM
WHERE L ORDERKEY = OLD ROW.O ORDERKEY






A.7.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER LINEITEM STATUS P LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL





Protect lineitems with tax amount greater than 4500.
A.8.1 View Definition










WHERE L ORDERKEY = O ORDERKEY
AND L TAX ∗ L EXTENDEDPRICE > 4500
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P8;
A.8.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER HIGH TAX
BEFORE UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW





SELECT ∗ FROM LINEITEM
WHERE L ORDERKEY = OLD ROW.O ORDERKEY






A.8.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER HIGH TAX LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW
FOR EACH ROW MODE DB2SQL




All orders from customers from nation 10 (Iran) which total more than 250000 have
to be protected for at least 2 years. This policy overlaps with policy #3.
A.9.1 View Definition












C CUSTKEY = O CUSTKEY
AND C NATIONKEY = N NATIONKEY
AND N NATIONKEY = 10
AND O TOTALPRICE > 250000
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE
REFRESH TABLE P9;
A.9.2 Trigger on Orders
CREATE TRIGGER IRANIAN ORDERS
BEFORE UPDATE OF O COMMENT ,O TOTALPRICE ON ORDERS
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM CUSTOMER, NATION
WHERE C CUSTKEY = OLD ROW.O CUSTKEY
AND C NATIONKEY = N NATIONKEY
AND N NATIONKEY = 10






A.9.3 Trigger on Lineitem
CREATE TRIGGER IRANIAN ORDERS LI
BEFORE UPDATE OF L COMMENT ,L EXTENDEDPRICE ON LINEITEM
79
REFERENCING OLD AS OLD ROW NEW AS NEW ROW




SELECT ∗ FROM CUSTOMER, NATION,ORDERS
WHERE C CUSTKEY = O CUSTKEY
AND C NATIONKEY = N NATIONKEY
AND N NATIONKEY = 10
AND O TOTALPRICE > 250000







Policies 10-12 involve views with aggregated values. Triggers must incur the cost
of executing the specific query at every relevant update. Policy 10 describes a view
for an abstract policy where a manager may want to protect the average value of
urgent orders.
A.10.1 View Definition
CREATE TABLE P10 AS
(
SELECT
COUNT (∗) AS CNT,
SUM(O TOTALPRICE) AS S,
O ORDERPRIORITY
FROM ORDERS
WHERE O ORDERPRIORITY = “1− URGENT”
GROUP BY O ORDERPRIORITY
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)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P10;
A.11 Policy 11
Another policy involving an aggregate that makes the use of triggers infeasible. The
policy designer may want to ensure that the sum of total prices that are below a cer-
tain limit from certain customers is protected. A trigger would have to re-compute
this query at every relevant update. Active recomputation would only require a
lookup on SUM(totalprice) in this materialized view. The special customers in this
case are those whose ID is divisible by 50.
A.11.1 View Definition
CREATE TABLE P11 AS
(
SELECT COUNT (∗) AS CNT,
SUM(O TOTALPRICE) AS S,
O CUSTKEY
FROM ORDERS
WHERE MOD(O CUSTKEY, 50) = 0
GROUP BY O CUSTKEY
)
DATA INITIALLY DEFERRED REFRESH IMMEDIATE;
REFRESH TABLE P11;
A.12 Policy 12
An aggregate over all possible orders.
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A.12.1 View Definition
CREATE TABLE P12 AS
(
SELECT COUNT (∗) AS CNT,
SUM(O TOTALPRICE) AS S,
O ORDERSTATUS
FROM ORDERS
GROUP BY O ORDERSTATUS
)
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